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A JURISPRUDENTIAL QUILT OF TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF TRIBAL COURT APPROACHES TO DETERMINING CIVIL
ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
Jacob Maiman-Stadtmauer*
“Every government has two broad powers: criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction. Criminal
jurisdiction maintains law and order. Civil jurisdiction maintains everything else, particularly a
society's culture and values. A government that loses its right to regulate civil matters eventually
loses its identity.” Chief Justice Richard Lerblance, Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court1
Introduction
In 1998, Tammy Lang embezzled approximately $8,000 from the Ho-Chunk Nation’s
child daycare.2 Lang was a non-Indian3 employed by the tribe as the Director for the Ho-Chunk
Nation’s Head Start program.4 However, instead of supporting the children of the tribe, she
abused her position to steal the tribe’s money to start her own business.5 The FBI declined to
prosecute Lang, and the Ho-Chunk Nation could not prosecute Lang. 6 As a result, the Ho-Chunk
Nation was left with few choices: it could let this injustice stand; it could attempt recovery in
state or federal court, subjecting itself to the laws of another sovereign; or the Ho-Chunk Nation
could assert its sovereignty and sue Lang in its own courts.7 The Ho-Chunk Nation sued Lang for

*

J.D., Columbia Law School, 2023. I am indebted to Professors Kellen Funk and Precious Benally, and to Bridgett
McCoy for their invaluable guidance and feedback through my drafts. I am also thankful to Professor Shelbi Meissner
who introduced to me to the issues facing Native Americans today. I am grateful to the staff at the American Indian
Law Journal for their support, corrections, and edits.
1
Enlow v. Bevenue, 4 Okla. Trib. 175, 176 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup. Ct. 1994).
2
Ho-Chunk Nation v. Lang, 2 Am. Tribal L. 233, 241 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 1999).
3
This article uses the term Indian and non-Indian because of their legal significance and pursuant to their legal
definitions in federal law. Thus, in this paper, except for Part I.1.A. which discusses the historical background for
tribal jurisdiction, Indian means “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any [federally] recognized Indian
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.” 25 U.S.C. § 5129; Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009). This paper
uses the term Indian in part I.1.A even though the current legal definition is inapplicable because Indian was the term
used by treaties, legislation, and in much rhetoric throughout the United States history. See infra, Part I.1.A.
4
2 Am. Tribal L. at 237.
5
Id. at 241–42.
6
Id. The FBI had responsibility for prosecuting Lang in this matter. Id. Except where transferred to the state
government, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-Indians. 18 U.S.C. §
1152–53.
7
The Nation could not sue in federal court, because diversity jurisdiction would have been the only grounds for suit,
and the amount in controversy was less than $75,000. However, even if the federal courts had jurisdiction, it would
not change the importance of tribal courts in supporting tribes’ sovereignty.
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civil conversion in its own courts.8 Before the Ho-Chunk Tribal Court could render a verdict
against Lang, the court had to determine it had jurisdiction, both subject-matter jurisdiction9 and
personal jurisdiction.10 The Ho-Chunk Nation’s Tribal Court based subject-matter jurisdiction on
the personnel manual Lang signed, which acts as the Nation’s employment law, and on Lang
violating the laws and the constitution of the Nation.11 The court based personal jurisdiction on
Lang’s employment by the nation and the mutually consented to relationship.12 The Ho-Chunk
Nation Trial Court ordered Tammy Lang to return to the Tribe the embezzled funds and to
“repay the Nation for its attorney fees for each hearing appearance.”13
Tammy Lang stole from the Ho-Chunk Nation. But her $8,000 theft was insufficient for
the FBI to get involved. Had the Ho-Chunk Nation sued Lang in state court, it would have had to
subject itself to a foreign sovereign’s judgment, in a decision about the welfare of the Ho-Chunk
Nation’s children. Instead, the Ho-Chunk Nation filled the jurisdictional gap left by the FBI
declining to prosecute; in so doing the Ho-Chunk Nation asserted its sovereignty and protected
its future, finding justice in its own courts.
Today, the United States is reckoning with the terrifying human costs of gaps in criminal
jurisdiction and underenforcement of criminal law in Indian country.14 The Tribal Law and Order
Act (“TLOA”),15 the 2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA

8

2 Am. Tribal L. at 43.
Subject matter jurisdiction is “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to
which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.” Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019).
10
Personal jurisdiction refers to a “court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a
defendant's personal rights, rather than merely over property interests.” Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019)
11
2 Am. Tribal L. at 237. Ho-Chunk Nation subject-matter jurisdiction based on personnel manuals is discussed in
further detail below. See, e.g. infra, note 235.
12
2 Am. Tribal L. at 237.
13
2 Am. Tribal L. at 246–47
14
See, e.g., URB. INDIAN HEALTH INST., MISSING AND MURDERED INDIGENOUS WOMEN & GIRLS 2 (2018); Graham
Lee Brewer, No One Knows How Many Indigenous Women are Murdered Each Year. That Makes the Deaths Hard
to Stop, NBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2021, 5:00 am), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/no-one-knows-how-manyindigenous-women-are-murdered-each-n1277565; Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women, NATIVE WOMENS
WILDERNESS (last visited Feb. 18, 2022), https://www.nativewomenswilderness.org/mmiw (collecting reports on
murdered and missing indigenous women).
15
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261. See also, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Law and Order Act Details, TURTLE TALK (Jul. 19, 2010) https://turtletalk.blog/2010/07/19/tribal-law-and-order-actdetails/ (providing a breakdown of the major provisions of TLOA).
9
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2013”),16 and the 2022 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA 2022”)17
reflect Congress’ intent to empower tribal courts and take key steps towards addressing this
issue. But significant problems remain, the costs of which can only be measured in human
lives.18
One route to justice despite the gaps in criminal jurisdiction and underenforcement of
criminal law is civil actions in tribal courts. Civil suits provide a mechanism for redress even
when criminal prosecution is not available or practical. Thus, civil proceedings may act as a
plaintiff’s last hope for justice.19
Civil suits can help compensate for the underenforcement of criminal law.20 While they
may not provide the same punishment, torts “provide essential remedies for human rights
abuses,”21 can provide vindication for victims,22 and deterrence against those individuals who
seek to take advantage of the jurisdictional gaps to commit crime.23 Further, civil suits allow

16

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. See also JANE M. SMITH,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43324, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 4 (2013) (noting “the
VAWA Reauthorization re-vests Indian tribes with the inherent authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit dating
and domestic violence crimes against Indians within the tribes’ jurisdictions provided the non-Indians have certain
enumerated ties to the tribe and the tribes provide protections for the rights of domestic abuse criminal defendants.”).
17
Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, 136 Stat. 840; Press Release,
White House, Fact Sheet: Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (Mar. 16, 2022) (avail. at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/16/fact-sheet-reauthorization-of-theviolence-against-women-act-vawa/). The impact of VAWA 2022 is yet to be seen, but it is difficult to imagine that
VAWA 2022 will fix this horrible problem. Regardless, as Lang shows, violence against Native women is not the
only threat to tribes.
18
Perhaps the key indicator that TLOA and VAWA did not fix the problem is that the Urban Indian Health Institute’s
report on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls was published five years after VAWA was passed.
See, Urb. Indian Health Inst., supra note 14.
19
See e.g. Stacy L. Leeds, [Dis]Respecting the Role of Tribal Courts, 42 HUM. RTS. 20, 21 (2017) (noting “[w]hen
non-Indians commit crimes within a tribe’s jurisdiction, federal courts have imposed a blanket prohibition on the
exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . .” thus tribes have to “rely on civil remedies” “to address
non-Indian conduct within their jurisdiction”).
20
See, e.g. Id.
21
Lisa J. Laplante, Human Torts, 39 CARDOZO L. REV 245, 245 (2017); See also, Jane Wright, Tort Law and Human
Rights (2d ed., 2017).
22
See, e.g., Arthur C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918–919 (2010)
(discussing different theories of torts, and its basis as “sort of conduct our legal system defines as wrongfully injurious
toward another such that, when committed, the victim is entitled to exact something from the wrongdoer”); Cristina
Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 70 (2012) (discussing the
foundations of dignitary torts and how they were “historically treated” as “protecting a key component in personal
security—namely, interests in individual personality”).
23
See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 18 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing how tort
liability generally “helps to prevent future tortious actions, by threatening potential wrongdoers with liability if they
cause actionable harm.”).
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victims to control the course of litigation, rather than ceding control of it to the government.24
Since a crucial element of sovereignty is the ability to provide a forum to redress wrongs against
its citizens,25 availability of civil suits in tribal courts are important as a way for tribes to achieve
justice, protect their citizens, and assert their sovereignty26.
In addition to the devastating harms of enforcement gaps, tribal civil jurisdiction takes on
increased significance following McGirt v. Oklahoma.27 McGirt effectively expanded Indian
country. 28 Land status plays a key role in the Supreme Court’s precedent on tribal civil
jurisdiction.29 Thus, this expansion will entail a corresponding increase in at least the geographic
scope of tribal jurisdiction. In Hicks, the Supreme Court reduced the relevance of the location of
the injury in determining tribal civil jurisdiction, and three justices argued using location in the
jurisdictional inquiry creates an “unstable jurisdictional crazy quilt.”30 However, it is unclear
whether Hicks had an impact because tribal court decisions suggest tribal courts largely disregard

24

This concern is compounded in Indian Country, where non-tribal governments typically have jurisdiction over both
criminal enforcement and adjudication.
25
Southwest Center for Law and Policy, Creative Civil Remedies Against Non-Indian Offenders in Indian Country
(2008) (https://www.justice.gov/archive/ovw/docs/civil-remedies.pdf); see also, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223
(1959) (“There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction [] would undermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves”).
Criminal jurisdiction is also crucial to tribal sovereignty and safety, but is outside of the scope of this paper. See
generally, Discussion of VAWA FAQs, Special Domestic Violence Criminal Adjudication,
https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/sdvcj-overview/faqs; Breanna P. Riley, Protecting All Women: Tribal Protection
Orders and Required Enforcement Under VAWA, 24 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 209 (2019). Arthur Taylor von
Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279 (1983); Ray
Worthy Campbell, Personal Jurisdiction and National Sovereignty, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020); M. Gatsby
Miller, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM L.
REV. 1825 (2014).
26
See, c.f.. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (noting that in “the exercise of state jurisdiction [can] undermine the authority
of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence [] infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves”).
27
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2478–79 (2020). McGirt considered an application of the Major Crimes Act to a member of the
Creek Tribe in Oklahoma. Id. at 2459. However, at its core, the case considered the definition of Indian country. Id.
at 2459. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, refers to Indian country but neglects to define it, so there is no
independent definition of Indian country for 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Indian country for the Act is instead defined by 18
U.S.C. § 1151. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977). This is why the Court in McGirt specifically
looks to 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). 140 S. Ct. at 2459. Further, the Supreme Court has held that Indian country “as defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 1151… applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction.” California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 n.5 (1987).
28
140 S. Ct. at 2468 (citation omitted) (interpreting Solem v. Bartlett and clarifying a reservation is only diminished
when Congress clearly evinces intent to diminish the reservation in the tribe’s allotment act, and banning the use of
extratextual factors to inject ambiguity into the allotment act).
29
See, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (“To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands”).
30
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (holding the presumption against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
applies on tribal land); Id. at 383 (Souter, J. concurring).
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the Supreme Court guidance on how the tribal courts should determine their jurisdiction.31 And
further, tribal courts continue to value where the injury occurred and have limited Hicks to its
facts.32 Thus, the expansion of Indian country following McGirt suggests that tribes will
similarly expand the reach of their civil jurisdiction. So, tribal approaches to determining civil
jurisdiction take on even more relevance today.
Little recent scholarship has examined how tribal courts determine their jurisdiction.33
This gap is noteworthy for several reasons, but especially because non-Indians are almost always
required to exhaust their options in tribal court before they can challenge a tribe’s jurisdiction in
federal court.34 As a consequence of this exhaustion requirement, and because parties may be
satisfied with the verdict or find the case is not worth the heavy costs associated with litigation in
federal courts, many cases do not end up in federal court.35

31

See infra Parts II–III.
See, e,g., Nelson v. Pfizer, Inc., 8 Navajo Rptr. 369, 376–77 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (quoting McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d
530, 540 (2002)) (noting that federal courts have “specifically concluded that the limitation of Hicks to its facts
continued the general rule that Montana still applies only on non-Indian fee land”).
33
But see, Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country in Indian Country after Plains Commerce
Bank: State Courts and the Judicial Sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 385 (discussing the
Navajo courts’ approach to jurisdiction). There are several articles that show there is nothing “unfair” with tribal
courts; see e.g. Jesse Sixkiller, Procedural Fairness: Ensuring Tribal Civil Jurisdiction After Plains Commerce Bank,
26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 779 (2009); discussing the Supreme Court’s precedent, see e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Tribal
Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010); Nancy
Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian Country, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973
(2000); proposing new paradigms for Tribal civil jurisdiction, see e.g., Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. REV. 1499 (2013); Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Incorporation
Without Assimilation, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 166 (2019); Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal
Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014); Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (2014); David A. Castleman, Personal
Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1253 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on
Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010); and discussing federal circuit splits over applications of the
Montana exceptions, see e.g., Winter King, et. al., Bridging the Divide: Water Wheel’s New Tribal Jurisdiction
Paradigm, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 723 (2011); Tyler L. Murphy, The State, The Tribe, and the Ugly: The Ninth Circuit
Stakes a Bad Claim on Indian Land for Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Window Rock, 63 VILL. L. REV.
157 (2018).
34
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985).
35
It is not possible to obtain exact numbers for this, but an empirical analysis of available data would benefit Native
American law. E-mail from Nat’l Indian L. Libr. to author (Feb. 8, 2022, 18:44 EST) (on file with author). See, c.f.,
Bus. And Corp. Litig. Comm., Am. Bar Assoc., Recent Developments in Tribal Court Litigation, A.B.A. BUS. L.
SECTION
§1.3.2
(May
10,
2021)
https://businesslawtoday.org/2021/05/tribal-courtlitigation/#132_Exhaustion_of_Tribal_Court_Review (noting non-Indian parties often try to sidestep the exhaustion
requirement by suing in federal court before exhausting their options “because litigation is expensive”).
32
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Tribal courts are the first and often final arbiters of their jurisdiction, and frequently
decide and apply their jurisdiction without the involvement of federal courts.36 Thus, it is
important to understand how different tribal courts approach the jurisdictional inquiry because
that approach reflects the day-to-day practice in Native American Nations. 37 Second,
sophisticated analysis and a wider understanding of tribal courts and their jurisprudence are
crucial to establishing their legitimacy in wider legal circles. 38
This article surveys how some tribal courts approach the jurisdictional inquiry to help
incorporate tribal courts into the discussion of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over non-Indians.
There are two key findings: 1) Tribal courts have sophisticated jurisprudence and procedures to
determine their civil jurisdiction; and 2) the Supreme Court’s precedent plays a limited role in
the jurisprudence of the surveyed tribes. A likely explanation of the minimal role of the Supreme
Court’s precedent is the exhaustion requirement established by National Farmers Union, which
insulates tribal courts from constant scrutiny of their decisions.39 This article argues that
increased respect for tribal legal systems is the solution to the disconnect between the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence and tribal practice.
This article begins in Part I with a brief overview of the history of Native American law,
a primer on jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the limits of tribes’ civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction.40 It tracks the Court’s rulings from the foundational case of Montana
v. United States to Plains Commerce Bank and discusses the general presumption against tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In Part II, this article examines how tribal courts determine their jurisdiction. It provides
the first analyses of civil jurisdiction jurisprudence in the Ho-Chunk Nation (“HCN”)41 and
Mashantucket (Western) Pequot Nation (“Mashantucket”). It also analyzes the Navajo Nation’s
jurisprudence. Through these analyses, this article provides a roadmap for other papers to take a
circuit-split approach to analyzing differences between tribes’ jurisprudence. Further, this article

36

Getches, et. al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 623 (7th ed. 2017).
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 3 (1995); see also, generally, Robert B. Porter, Cleaning Up the
Colonizer’s Mess: An Important Role for Legal Scholarship About the Indigenous Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 431
(2002).
38
Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 3; see also, generally, Porter, at 431.
39
471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985)
40
This article analyzes civil jurisdiction, so unless otherwise indicated, “jurisdiction” refers to civil jurisdiction, not
criminal jurisdiction.
41
In 2012, the Tribal Law Journal published a profile of the HCN government and law, which provides an overview
of the Nation’s legal systems generally, but it does not analyze HCN law on jurisdiction in depth. Daniel B. Snyder,
Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Law Profile, 12 TRIBAL L. J. 1, 1–12 (2011).
37
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provides the first survey of tribal court decisions on civil jurisdiction, analyzing over seventy
decisions by twenty-six tribes. This article’s analysis, grounded in tribal jurisprudence,
contributes to the scarce body of literature on tribal law, and helps to bring tribal courts into
discussions over tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Finally, in Part III, the analysis of tribal law provides this paper’s key insight, that for all
the ink spilled over Montana v. United States and its progeny. Those cases have little impact on
how tribal courts determine their jurisdiction. This article’s main finding also provides support
for increased study of tribal courts, as the irrelevance of Montana could only be discovered
through analysis of tribal court jurisprudence.
I. HISTORY OF NATIVE AMERICAN LAW AND BACKGROUND LAW ON JURISDICTION
A. A. Historical Background
1. Pre-Colonial Tribal Polities and Conflict Resolution
It is an unremarkable statement that long before contact with Europeans, tribes had
governments.42 Before Christopher Columbus arrived in North America, there were millions of
people and hundreds of independent tribes with their own governments on the continent;43 these
tribes had their own methods to resolve conflicts, both within the tribe and with non-tribe
members.44 While Europe was returning to some level of calm after the Hundred Years’ War, the

42

VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 6–8 (1999) (discussing inter-tribal relations before European contact
and traditional treatymaking, as well as mentioning pre-European contact tribal governments); CHARLES WILKINSON
& THE AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 4 (2d ed. 2004) (noting European
recognition of tribal governments as part of early treatymaking between tribes and colonies); see also David A.
Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1253 (2006).
43
See generally, e.g., ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, AMERICA IN 1492: THE WORLD OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES BEFORE THE
ARRIVAL OF COLUMBUS (1991) (discussing pre-contact society in America).
44
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 1 (4th ed. 2012); see also Tribal Nations and the United
States:
An
Introduction,
Nat’l
Congress
of
Am.
Indians
9
(2020)
(https://www.ncai.org/tribalnations/introduction/Indian_Country_101_Updated_February_2019.pdf) (providing a
brief overview of the history of some tribal governments and the relationship between the United States and tribes);
SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 14 (1989); Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Peacemaking, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 240–246 (1997) (discussing pre-colonial
Mohawk, Oneida, Onodaga, Cayuga and Seneca nations’ methods of resolving conflict within and between the tribes,
which relied on consensus); CHARLES E. CLELAND, ET. AL, FAITH IN PAPER: THE ETHNOHISTORY AND LITIGATION OF
UPPER GREAT LAKES INDIAN TREATIES 23–24 (2011) (briefly discussing traditional Algonquian political structure);
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Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy established a system of inter-tribal peace and security through
consensus based decision-making.45 As Europeans first learned of the continent, the Incan
Empire covered some 3,000 miles and ruled approximately seven million people, maintaining
rule through sophisticated bureaucracies, tax systems, and resettlement systems.46
2. Tribes and the United States
The United States has never had “a single, clearly articulated American Indian policy at
any time.”47 Rather, historians divide the roughly 500 years of post-contact history into different
eras.48 A review of these eras is important, as the contradicting approaches taken during each set
up the “checkerboard” reservations49 that are partially responsible for the “‘complex patchwork
of federal, state, and tribal law that govern Indian country.”50
a. Treaties and the Establishment of Reservations (1492–1871)
From initial contact between Europeans and Native Americans until 1871, when
Congress terminated the treaty-making power of tribes,51 colonizing powers and Congress “dealt

SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 14–33 (discussing the government, political structures,
and methods of conflict resolution of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois League, which included six tribes), the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation (which was composed of multiple tribes), the Lakota (Teton Sioux) Nation (which “was a
confederation of seven bands”), the Pueblos (“a diverse collection of tribes, who shared the same geographic area . . .
and organized their societies in similar ways”, but were each “autonomous, having [their] own social organization,
leadership, and language”)).
45
Porter, supra note 44, at 242; Hundred Years’ War, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018)
https://www.history.com/topics/middle-ages/hundred-years-war.
46
Josephy, supra note 43, at 215–47.
47
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.01 (Neil Jessup Newton ed., 2017) [hereinafter, Cohen’s].
48
Id. “Frequently described in six time frames, they are: (1) Post-Contact and Pre-Constitutional Development (1492–
1789); (2) The Formative Years (1789–1871); (3) Allotment and Assimilation (1871–1928); (4) Indian Reorganization
(1928–1942); (5) Termination (1943–1961); and (6) Self-Determination and Self-Governance (1961–present).” Id.
This article collapses periods 1 and 2, because it discusses this period only to establish the general principles that
Indian tribes have long had governments and adjudicated disputes. This period is also notable as the initial source of
the tribal jurisdictional issues. See infra I.A.1.a. Not all scholars agree with Cohen’s Handbook on the classification
of eras. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUT SHELL, at V (5th ed. 2009). This paper
skips over the debate of how to break up eras of Federal-Tribal relationships, because the overview of these eras is to
set the stage for the contemporary picture of tribes and Indian country.
49
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 466 (1975).
50
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016) (citation omitted).
51
Indian Appropriation Act, 16 Stat. 544 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71).
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with individual tribes by formal treaties.”52 Treaties made before the United States was
established generally recognized tribal sovereignty.53 Treaties made with the United States and
other colonizers “dealt with the difficult political and jurisdictional problems created by offenses
committed by Indians against non-Indians” and vice-versa.54 Most treaties with the United States
did not expressly address civil jurisdiction and those that did guaranteed state laws would not
apply to tribes.55 The mid-1800s saw a shift in treaties towards expanding federal control over
tribes, governments’ and settlers’ increasing use of coercion, “restricting [] tribes to specified
reservations . . .”, and forcing tribes from their homelands to distant reservations.56
The pre-colonial and treaty-making era is significant for a number of reasons: first, it
shows that tribes have long had governments, that were able to fairly adjudicate claims within
their societies;57 second, tribal sovereignty is inherent and longstanding; third, “[t]he varying
jurisdictional provisions of the treaties from the treaty-making period are largely responsible for
the complex jurisdictional pattern in Indian country today”;58 and fourth, it was this period when
the United States first established “reservations.”59
b. Checkerboarding through Allotment (1871–1934)

52

CHARLES WILKINSON & THE AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 3–6 (2d ed.
2004). Interactions between Indians and European Colonizers were not conducted exclusively through treatymaking.
See Cohen’s, supra note 47, § 1.02[1] (discussing examples of how English colonists stole land from tribes); see also
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 4–6 (4th ed. 2012) (discussing the conflicts between
European colonizers and tribes and noting that European and American colonists “invad[ed] Indian territory and [stole]
land”). However, the official policy of the European powers and the United States was to deal with tribes through
treaties. Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 1.02[1], 1.03
53
Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 1.02[1].
54
Id. at § 1.03[1].
55
Id.
56
Id.; Canby, supra note 48.
57
This point seems unnecessary to make. However, given the longstanding stereotypes and depictions of tribes,
especially in the pre-colonial era, it is important to establish that tribes were sophisticated polities with their own
methods of fairly resolving disputes. Especially since Supreme Court decisions today are still colored by an idea that
tribes are unable to fairly adjudicate. Julia M. Bedell, The Fairness of Tribal Court Juries and non-Indian Defendants,
41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 260–265, 253 (discussing the Supreme Court’s longstanding skepticism of the “fairness
of tribal court practices” beginning with Ex Parte Crow Dog in 1883 and stretching to the oral arguments in Dollar
General v. Choctaw Nation in 2015) (citations omitted).
58
Cohen’s, supra note 47, § 1.03[1].
59
Id.
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During and soon after the treaty period, the United States pursued a policy of
assimilation.60 This policy is reflected in the attempted ethnocide of Native American culture61,
racist rhetoric during this time period and, the General Allotment Act (“GAA”).62 Under
allotment, “[r]eservations became checkerboards as the sale of surplus land to whites isolated
individual Indian allotments.”63 The GAA created a “patchwork of land held in trust for the tribe
by the federal government (‘tribal trust land’), Indian owned land [Indian fee land], and nonIndian fee land.” When allotment ended, “Indian land holdings were reduced from 138 million in
1887 to 48 million in 1934.”64
During the Allotment era, the Supreme Court also established the “plenary power
doctrine,” which gave Congress complete and exclusive control over the tribes in all matters,
including the power to unilaterally “abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty,” without the
tribe’s consent.65 During this time, the Bureau of Indian Affairs first established courts of Indian

60

Id. at § 1.04.
This attempted ethnocide is best embodied by Captain Pratt’s statement that “all the Indian there is in the race should
be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save the man.” It is impossible to summarize the horrors of this period. William
Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for
Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV 1, 41 (2002); Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare
Native American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 379, 393 (1998). This article lists some
articles that discuss the ethnocide and terrifying actions during this period here: Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding
School: “The Last Acceptable Racism” and the United States’ Genocide of Native Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137
(2013) (providing an overview of the United States’ attempts to annihilate Native Americans and arguing “the use of
the Indian boarding schools was an act of genocide”); Bradford, supra note 61, at 19–75 (discussing the “brutal reality
of invasion, slavery, forced relocation, genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and forcible denial of the right to selfdetermination” in the United States’ treatment of Native Americans across American history, including the Allotment
Era); Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, and Covell v.
Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609, 613–619 (2010) (briefly discussing atrocities committed by the U.S. government
during the Allotment Era).
62
Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 1.04. The GAA was part of the U.S.’s “social policy” of assimilation during this era.
63
Id. During allotment, tribal reservations were “allotted” to tribal members, breaking up cohesive territories into
patches. CONF. OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AM. INDIAN L. DESKBOOK 35–36 (Editing Comm. & Clay Smith eds., 4th ed.
2008) [hereinafter Deskbook]. Any land not allotted to Indians was “opened for homesteading by settlers.” Id. at 37.
Land allotted to Indians was held “in trust” by the Federal government for 25 years, and then conveyed to the “allottee”
in fee simple. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119 §5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), repealed by Act of June 18, 1934, Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383 § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5101). This established
the tri-partite division of land status in Indian Country: land held in trust by the Federal government, land owned in
fee by Indians (Indian-owned land)63, and land owned in fee by non-Indians (i.e. non-Indian fee land). Id. Indianowned land is “fully alienable . . . .” Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 564 (1992).
64
Id. at §1.04; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 415 (1989); Cnty.
of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1998).
65
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533, 566 (1903).
61
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Offenses, also known as “C.F.R. courts.”66 These C.F.R. courts “administer[ed] a code
promulgated by the Secretary of Interior” and while the “judges [we]re Indians, they were
appointed by, and responsible to, the BIA.”67
c. Indian Reorganization Era (1934–1943)
The Allotment Era officially ended in 1934 when Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (“IRA”). The IRA repealed allotment,68 “extended indefinitely the trust
period for existing allotments still in trust,”69 and “was intended to reverse the General Allotment
Act’s polic[ies].”70 The IRA also encouraged tribal self-government by allowing tribes “to adopt
their own constitutions, [and] to become federally chartered corporations . . . .”71 IRA
constitutions had to be approved by the United States,72 but “formally acknowledge[d tribes’]
powers that the U.S. government would recognize.”73 In line with this, the IRA also allowed
tribes to establish “tribal courts” instead of C.F.R. courts, with “judges responsible to the tribe
rather than the” Bureau of Indian Affairs and applying the tribes’ constitution instead of the BIA
code.74 The IRA thus “la[id] a foundation for inclusion of tribes in the state jurisdictional system
. . . .”75
d. The Termination Era (1943–1961)

66

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 341 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 1998); Vincent C.
Milani, The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal Courts, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1994);
Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 61.
67
Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 61.
68
Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 383 § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5101).
69
Canby, supra note 48, at 24; Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 383 § 2, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 5102).
70
Deskbook, supra note 63, at 35–36. As part of the reversal, the IRA authorized the “Secretary of the Interior . . . to
restore to tribal ownership any remaining surplus reservation lands, except those [] within federal reclamation
project[s], and to . . . interests in real property within or without reservations for the purpose of providing land for
Indians.” Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 383 § 3, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5104–08); Deskbook,
supra note 63, at 40.
71
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 11 (4th ed. 2012); Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 383
§ 16, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5123–26).
72
The Encyclopedia of Native American Legal Tradition 147 (Bruce Elliot Johansen ed., 1998).
73
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 2 (Eric D. Lemont 2006)
(those recognized powers include “power to form a government, define membership[], regulate the domestic relations
of tribal members, . . . [tax] tribal members and nonmembers doing business within the reservation (subject to
conditions), remove or exclude nonmembers from the reservation, regulate []tribal property, and administer justice
with respect to all disputes and offenses of or among tribal members [except for the Major Crimes Act]”).
74
Vincent C. Milani, The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal Courts, 31 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2014).
75
Deskbook, supra note 63, at 42 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
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The Termination Era reversed the steps towards tribal independence and “terminat[ed]
the federally recognized status of approximately 109 tribes and bands.”76 When a tribe was
terminated their reservation was abolished.77 Further, the tribe’s relationship with the Federal
government, exemption from state laws, and independence was similarly extinguished.78
e. Self Determination (1961–Today)
After the disastrous impact of the Termination Era, the United States returned to a policy
that encouraged tribal self-determination.79 This seismic shift in United States policy was not
organic, rather, Indian advocacy movements during the 1960s played a crucial role. The selfdetermination era is largely characterized by support for tribes and their governments.80
During this period, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), which
incorporated parts of the Bill of Rights against tribes81 and “authorized tribes to establish court
systems for administering justice.”82 The current era is also notable for tribes systematically
developing their courts and governments.

76

Id. at 43.
Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 1.06.
78
Id. (During this period, Congress also passed Public Law 280 (PL 280), which stripped tribes in six states of criminal
jurisdiction, and transferred jurisdiction from the Federal government to the state where the tribe’s reservation was
located. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 13 (4th ed. 2012). “Before [PL]280[,] the federal
government and the tribal courts shared jurisdiction [] over almost all [] matters involving Indians on the reservations.
With [PL]280, affected states received Criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. [PL]280 [also] opened state
courts to civil litigation that previously had been possible only in tribal or federal courts.” Carole Goldberg, Questions
and
Answers
About
Public
Law
280,
TRIBAL
CT.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.tribalinstitute.org/articles/goldberg.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2021)).
79
Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 1.07; Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, (https://www.ncai.org/tribalvawa/resources/tribal-law-order-act) (“expanding punitive abilities of tribal courts across the nation”); Indian Tribal
Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559 (providing support for the development
tribal legal systems) (https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ559/PLAW-106publ559.pdf).
80
DAVID H. GETCHES, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 225–26, 232–33 (4th ed., 1998). See
also THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 288–89 (Bruce Elliott Johansen ed., 1998)
(discussing the importance of Native American youth movements in pushing the United States away from the
termination policy).
81
Cohen’s, supra note 47 § 1.07. This article does not discuss the serious debate surrounding ICRA. See id. (discussing
differing responses by tribes).
82
JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 97 (2d ed., 2010).
77
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3. The Consequences of the United States’ Native American Policies
The result of these pendular swings in federal policy is an inconsistent, nearly
unintelligible field of law. Importantly, this history resulted in Indian country83 being a
patchwork of land owned by tribes, the United States government held in trust for the tribes,
individual members of tribes, and non-Indians.84 Indian Country’s patchiness has inevitably
carried over to issues in tribal jurisdiction.
B. Background in Native American Law: Worcester, Williams, and Lone Wolf
Before analyzing the concrete limits on adjudicative authority established by the Supreme
Court over the last 40 years, it is important to understand the long-standing precedent that
supports tribal sovereignty. The foundational case for tribal sovereignty is more than 150 years
old; in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court recognized “the right of the Indians to self-government,”
and stated that states could not interfere when tribes exercised their inherent sovereignty.85
However, 70 years later, in 1901, the Court in Lone Wolf struck a blow against the respect for
tribes and established the Congress’ plenary power over tribes.86
In 1959, the Court reiterated its support for tribal sovereignty in Williams v. Lee. 87 There,
the Court affirmed Worcester and recognized the rights of “Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them.”88 The Court again declared that states could not encroach upon the sphere of
tribal sovereignty.
C. Jurisdiction in non-Tribal Courts
The rest of this article delves into the procedures by which tribes determine their
jurisdiction. A significant amount of the tribal procedure is inspired by the jurisdictional scheme
used in other courts in the United States. So, it makes sense to briefly review how non-tribal
courts in America determine jurisdiction.

83

This article uses the term Indian country, because it is widely used in Native American law and is specifically used
throughout the U.S. Code. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
84
18 U.S.C. § 1151. Indian Country includes 1) “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation” regardless of fee
ownership or rights-of-way, 2) “all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the [U.S.],” and 3) “all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.” Id.
85
31 U.S. 515, 584 (1832).
86
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
87
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
88
Id. at 220.
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In order to hear a case and render binding judgement, courts must have both jurisdiction
over the subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties.89 Subject matter jurisdiction is
a baseline requirement, and cannot be waived.90 When it comes to subject matter, courts are
either courts of general jurisdiction or limited jurisdiction.91 Courts of general jurisdiction have
no limits to their subject-matter jurisdiction.92 That is to say, they can adjudicate most any cause
of action.93 Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction.94
Courts of limited jurisdiction have more stringent limits on the types of actions they can
adjudicate.95 Federal courts, for example, are courts of limited jurisdiction.96 Generally, federal
courts only have jurisdiction over federal causes of action, claims that raise federal questions,
and suits between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.97
Federal courts also have supplemental jurisdiction, which means that if a suit finds its way to
federal court, related claims in the same suit will follow the suit to federal court, even if those
claims could not enter federal court independently.98
Courts must also have personal jurisdiction over the parties in a dispute.99 The personal
jurisdiction scheme in state courts is subject to the Due Process Clause of the 14th
amendment.100 The objection to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is an “individual
right” and “like other such rights, can be waived.” 101 So even if personal jurisdiction would
otherwise be lacking, an individual may consent to a court’s jurisdiction.102 Additionally, states

89

Jurisdiction Definition, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jurisdiction (last visited Nov. 5,
2022).
90
Linda. J. Silberman, et al. Civil Procedure Theory and Practice 285–86 (5th ed. 2017).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
28 U.S.C. § 1331–32. Of course, like most everything in law, there are significant exceptions. Federal courts also
have jurisdiction over admiralty suits, bankruptcy proceedings, certain types of securities suits, and more. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333–34; Westlaw Practical Law Litigation, Exchange Act: Section 10(b) Jurisdictional Defenses, Practical Law
Practice Note w-000-6535. Diversity and federal question jurisdiction are the most common types of federal
jurisdiction, and suffice to illustrate the concept of limited subject-matter jurisdiction.
98
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
99
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. 137. S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) [hereafter “BMS”]. The personal jurisdiction
of the federal courts is unlimited within the United States but is limited by Congress when it comes to foreign parties.
Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1703, 1703 (2020).
100
BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1779. (collecting cases).
101
Ins. Corp. of Ir. V. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
102
Id.

14

must affirmatively authorize their courts’ personal jurisdiction. Thus, states adopt “long arm
statutes” which define the scope of their personal jurisdiction over non-residents.103
There are two types of personal jurisdiction:104 general and specific.105 When a court has
general personal jurisdiction over a party, it can hear any claim against that party, even if the
action is not related to the party’s connection to the state the court is in.106 As a general rule,
natural persons are subject to general personal jurisdiction where they are domiciled; and
corporations are subject to general personal jurisdiction in their state of incorporation and in the
state where their headquarters is.107 When a court has specific personal jurisdiction over a party,
it has jurisdiction only when suits “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.”108 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court clarified that the Due Process Clause of the
14th amendment restrains states from exercising personal jurisdiction as they see fit.109 Rather,
before a state’s court can exercise jurisdiction over a party, the party must “have certain
minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”110
D. This summary is far from complete and does not touch on the complexities present in both
federal and state jurisdiction schemes. However, it should be sufficient background for the
purposes of this article.
E. Montana and its Progeny: The Supreme Court on Tribal Jurisdiction
Through Montana v. United States and six other key cases, the Supreme Court
established a framework for determining tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction.111 Montana remains the
foundational case and starting point in the Court’s modern jurisprudence on tribal civil
jurisdiction.112 In Montana, the Crow Tribe attempted to regulate non-members’ hunting and
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Long-Arm Statute, Legal Information Inst. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/long-arm_statute (last visited Nov. 5,
2022).
104
This article leaves out discussion of in rem jurisdiction because it is irrelevant to the general thrust of this article.
105
BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1779–80.
106
Id. at 1780.
107
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
108
BMS, 137 S.Ct. at 1780 (brackets omitted) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)).
109
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110
BMS, 137 S.Ct. at 1780.
111
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
112
Id. In Montana, “the Crow Tribe of Montana sought to prohibit hunting and fishing within its reservation by anyone
who is not a member of the tribe.” Id. at 544. Montana contested the Tribe’s regulatory authority on non-Indian fee
land. Id. at 557.
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fishing activities on non-Indian fee land.113 The court recognized “Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”114 However, it held “the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”115 So, without a
“express congressional delegation,” a tribe could not exercise regulatory authority over nonmembers, subject to two key exceptions:116 first, tribes have jurisdiction over “the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements”117 (hereafter “consensual
relationships exception”); and second, tribes have “inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe” (hereafter “direct threat exception”).118 These exceptions laid the foundational
framework for determining tribal civil jurisdiction. In Strate, sixteen years later, the Court held
Montana’s approach applied to tribes’ adjudicatory authority.119 So, following Strate, Montana’s
presumption against tribes’ authority over non-members and Montana’s exceptions carried over
to the adjudicatory context.120
In 1985, through National Farmers Union,121 the Court introduced the exhaustion
requirement, which means parties must “exhaust[] the remedies available to them in the Tribal
Court system” before challenging a tribe’s jurisdiction in federal court.122 Further, the Court held
tribal courts were not “automatically foreclosed” from “exercis[ing] civil subject-matter
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Id. at 544.
Id. at 565.
115
Id. (citation omitted).
116
Id. at 564.
117
Id. at 565. (citation omitted).
118
Id. at 566. (citation omitted).
119
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
120
Id.
121
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985). (In National Farmers Union, a
minor who was a member of the Crow Tribe was hit by a motorcycle driven by a non-Indian on a school within the
boundaries of the Crow reservation but owned by the state of Montana. The minor’s guardian sued the school district,
“a political subdivision of” Montana. Id. After the tribal court decided against the school district, the defendants filed
an action in Montana District Court to enjoin the tribe from enforcing the decision. Id. at 848. The defendants claimed
jurisdiction in federal court under § 1331, federal question jurisdiction. Id. The District Court granted the injunction
and a divided Ninth Circuit reversed, finding “the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction could not be supported on
any constitutional, statutory, or common-law ground.” Id. at 848–49 (citation omitted)).
122
471 U.S. at 857 (footnote omitted) (The Court, however, stated exhaustion was not “required where an assertion
of tribal jurisdiction ‘is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,’ or where the action is patently
violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, … or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an
adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 856 n.21 (citation omitted).
114
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jurisdiction over non-Indians.”123 Rather, a tribal court’s jurisdiction depends on “a careful
examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested,
or diminished, [and] relevant statutes . . . .”124 Iowa Mutual extended National Farmer’s
exhaustion requirement to all claims that tribes exceeded their adjudicatory jurisdiction.125 The
Court in Iowa Mutual also clarified a suit heard in tribal court could only be relitigated in federal
court, and only if the tribal court lacked jurisdiction.126 Thus, in order to have the case heard
outside the tribal court, parties could only attack the tribal court’s jurisdiction.127
When the Court extended the Montana framework to tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction in
Strate, the Court also narrowly described the Montana exceptions.129 The Court insisted the
consensual relationships exception only applied when the activities at issue in the case were
similar to those listed in Montana itself.130 The Court further restricted the direct threat
exception, and required the “State[ court]’s . . . exercise of authority [over a dispute] trench
unduly on tribal self-government” to qualify under the direct threat exception;131 further, the
Court permitted jurisdiction only up to “what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
128

123

Id. at 855.
Id. at 855–56.
125
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987). Iowa Mutual reiterated the Court’s apparent support for
tribal courts’ assertions of jurisdiction, stating “[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands
is an important part of tribal sovereignty . . . Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in . . . tribal
courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute.” Id. at 18 (citation omitted). Courts
cited this “for the proposition that tribal court[s have] jurisdiction . . . over any reservation-based activities involving
a tribe or its members unless expressly restricted . . . .” Deskbook, supra note 63, at 252. However, Strate rejected this
approach in 1997. Id. at 252–54.
126
480 U.S. at 11-13, 20–22.
127
Id.
128
Strate, 520 U.S. at 442. In Strate, Stockert, a non-Indian employed by A-1, drove into Fredericks’ car on a state
highway within the Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold’s reservation. A-1 had a sub-contract with “a corporation
wholly owned by the Tribes[] to do landscaping work [for] . . . a tribal community building.” Id. Gisela Fredericks
was not an Indian, but her children and deceased spouse were members of the Three Affiliated Tribes. Id. at 442–43.
Fredericks sued A-1 and Stockert in tribal court, and the Defendants contested the tribe’s jurisdiction in federal court.
Id. at 444. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the tribe did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 443.
129
Id. at 446, 449–51.
130
Id. The situations described were: (1) Enforcing “on-reservation sales transaction[s] between nonmember plaintiff
and member defendants,” id. at 457 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)); (2) Applying permit taxes on
nonmembers owning livestock within the borders of the reservation, id. (citing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384
(1904)); (3) “[P]rescrib[ing] the terms upon which noncitizens may transact business within [the Tribe's] borders,” id.
(citing Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir., 1905) and; (4) Taxing on-reservation sales to nonmembers. Id.
(citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154–54 (1980)).
131
Id. at 458. The direct threat exception only covers "conduct [that] threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
124
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control internal relations.”132 Thus, tribes had no authority unless tribal authority was necessary
“to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’”133
In Hicks134 the Court extended Montana’s presumption that tribes lack jurisdiction over
non-Indians to include Indian fee land.135 The Court also struck a blow against the exhaustion
doctrine, holding that it was unnecessary for the State defendants to return to tribal court to
contest their jurisdiction, as it "would serve no purpose other than delay.”136 This did not
overrule National Farmers Union, but created another exception to the tribal exhaustion
requirement. The Court further held “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing
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Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). The Court also focused on the four cases listed after
the Court outlined the direct threat exception in Montana. Id. at 458. Two of the cases held state jurisdiction was
unduly intrusive upon tribal sovereignty: (1) Fisher v. Dist. Ct of Sixteenth Jud. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976)
(holding tribal courts "had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding when all parties were" Tribal members
who resided on the reservation) Strate, 520 U.S. at 452; and (2) Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (holding tribal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over "a claim by a non-Indian merchant seeking payment from tribe members for goods bought
on
credit
at
an
on-reservation
store.")
Strate,
520
U.S.
at
458.
In the other two cases, “the Court saw no impermissible intrusion” Id.; (3) Mont. Catholic Missions v. Missoula Cnty.,
200 U.S. 118, 228–29 (1906) (holding “Indians’ interest in [livestock] . . . situated on their reservations was not
sufficient to exempt such property, when owned by private individuals, from [state or territorial] taxation”); and
(4) Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898) (holding “[territorial] tax . . . on the cattle of [non-Indian] lessees is too
remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians”).
133
Strate, 420 U.S. at 459 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
134
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355 (2001). Hicks, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes, was suspected
of killing California bighorn sheep in Nevada off the reservation, a crime in Nevada. Id. A state game warden executed
a Nevada search warrant at Hicks’ home on Indian-fee land with approval from the tribe and accompanied by a tribal
police officer. Id. at 356. The warden did not find any evidence of the protected sheep. Id. After a tip from a tribal
police officer who saw mounted bighorn sheep heads in Hick’s home, game wardens executed a second Nevada search
warrant. Id. The wardens again found no evidence of protected sheep. Hicks sued both tribe and state officials and the
state of Nevada in tribal court alleging that the wardens committed torts and violated his civil rights, using 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. at 356–57. The tribal court and the Tribal Appeals Court both held that the tribe had jurisdiction. Id. The
state officials and Nevada attacked the tribe’s jurisdiction in federal court. Id. The federal district court and the Ninth
Circuit both found the tribal court had jurisdiction, with the Ninth Circuit finding “the fact that respondent’s home is
located on tribe-owned land within the reservation is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against
nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.” Id.
135
Id. at 360. The Court further suggested that tribal ownership of land was a necessary but insufficient condition of
finding tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. Id. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court ended by noting that the
Court had never “h[e]ld a non-Indian subject to the jurisdiction of a tribal court,” and refused to answer whether “tribal
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction are coextensive,” but criticized Justice O’Connor for answering in the
affirmative. Id. at 374.
136
Id. at 369 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 459–60) (quoting Strate’s “broaden[ing]” of the exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine).
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process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal selfgovernment or internal relations . . .”137 and tribes are courts of limited jurisdiction.138
The Court struck a further blow against tribal sovereignty in 2008 through Plains
Commerce.139 The Supreme Court held that tribes lack adjudicatory authority over the sale of
non-Indian fee land, and emphasized the Montana “exceptions concern regulation of “‘the
activities of nonmembers’ or ‘the conduct of non-Indians on fee land.’”140 The Court held
Montana’s consensual relationships exception “limits tribal jurisdiction . . . to the regulation of
the activities of nonmembers.”141 Plains Commerce held tribes could regulate non-Indian
conduct on non-Indian fee land only when non-Indians “intrude on the internal relations of the

137

Id.at 364.
Id. at 367. Because tribes’ inherent adjudicative authority is limited by Montana, they cannot “lay[] hold of all
subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction,” regardless of the location of the cause of dispute or
applicable laws, including § 1983 claims. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 82 at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)). The Court, in a rebuttal to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which the majority characterized as
a dissent, stated tribal courts only had jurisdiction over non-members under the direct threat exception when the issue
at controversy “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 370–71 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). And, under the consensual relationships
exception, the “other arrangements” only applied when “private individuals . . . voluntarily submitted themselves to
tribal regulatory jurisdiction by the arrangements that they (or their employers) entered . . . .” Id. at 371–72 (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). So, the state officials were not subject to tribal jurisdiction. Id.
139
Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008). The parties in Plains Commerce were
the Plains Commerce Bank (“the Bank”), a South Dakota corporation only tied to the reservation by “its business
dealings with tribal members;” the Longs, enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Tribe; and, the Long
Family Company, a company majority owned by the Longs. Id. at 320–321. The Bank resold land within the Cheyenne
River Sioux Indian Reservation, once owned by the Long family, which the Long Family Company had the option to
purchase. The Bank sold the land to non-Indians on better terms than those offered to the Long Company. Id. at 320–
22. The Long Company and the Longs then sued the Bank in tribal court on various grounds and were awarded
$750,000 plus interest in damages; the Bank appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the discrimination claim underlying the decision. Id. at 322–323. The tribal court and tribal appeals court held the tribe
had jurisdiction. Id. The Bank contested the jurisdiction in federal court, which found the tribal court had jurisdiction
under the consensual relationships exception. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding “[t]he Longs’ discrimination
claim . . . ‘arose directly from their preexisting commercial relationship with the bank’ [and] . . . the Tribe had authority
to regulate the business conduct of persons who ‘voluntarily deal with tribal members' . . . .” Id. (quoting 491 F.3d
878, 887).
140
Id. at 328–30.
141
Id. (quoting Big Horn Cnty. Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis in original). The
Court’s holding here seems analogous to holding that states can never have general personal jurisdiction over an outof-state defendant. Id. at 338 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656) (“we have emphasized
repeatedly in [tribal civil jurisdiction], . . . it is not ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’”).
138
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tribe or threaten tribal self-rule.”142 The Court also narrowed the direct threat exception, and held
it permits tribes only to regulate conduct that ‘“imperil[s] the subsistence’ of the tribal
community,” and suggested the threshold is whether “tribal power [is] necessary to avert
catastrophic consequences.”143 This summary of key cases from the Supreme Court’s decisions
on tribal courts’ adjudicative jurisdiction is not exhaustive, but provides a sufficient background
to contextualize tribal courts’ jurisdiction jurisprudence.144
II. TRIBAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
There is a large body of literature that explores the federal jurisprudence on tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction.145 There is similarly expansive literature proposing alternatives to the
Supreme Court’s Montana framework.146 However, few scholars have explored how tribes
determine their own adjudicatory jurisdiction.147 This part of the article discusses in detail how

Id. at 335. The Court also reframed the decisions under the Montana exceptions as only approving “regulations
[that] . . . flow directly from the[] limited sovereign interests” of tribal governance and internal relations. Id. The Court
then held that once the Long’s land was sold to the bank, it became non-Indian fee land, “removed from the tribe’s
immediate control, . . . alienated from the tribal trust,” such that its “resale . . . [is] no additional intrusion on tribal
relations or self-government.” Id. at 336. This part of the Court’s holding seems more like a discussion of the direct
threat exception, but the Court included it in the discussion of the first exception, seemingly as part of their reframing
of the first exception as simply recognizing “certain forms of nonmember behavior, even on non-Indian fee land, may
sufficiently affect the tribe as to justify tribal oversight.” Id. at 335. Whether the Court blurred the line between the
two exceptions is a question that merits further study but is beyond the scope of this article.
143
Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (quoting Cohen’s, supra note 47, at § 4.02[3][c]). The Court held the direct
threat exception did not apply, because it “stems from the same sovereign interests that give rise to the first [exception],
interests that do not reach to regulating the sale of non-Indian fee land.” Id. at 341. Since the land was already outside
of tribal ownership, the Court saw its resale as nothing more than “possibly disappointing to the Tribe.” Id.
144
See, e.g., Cooley v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1641–46 (2021) (a case in which the Supreme Court held, for
the first time, that a Montana exception was triggered, but relied on “the close fit between the second exception and
the circumstances [in the case]”).
145
See, e.g., supra note 33.
146
See, Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 33, at 784 n. 26, (listing: Grant
Christenson, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: The Case of Trespass to
Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527, 527 (2010-2011); Katherine J. Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining
Tribal Courts' Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1555-64 (2013) (arguing in favor of a minimum contacts
analysis); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation,
83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1189-98 (2004) (proposing a doctrinal shift toward "experiential sovereignty")).
147
The notable exception to this is the Navajo court system. There are books and articles dedicated to the Navajo
Nation’s jurisprudence, including their approach to civil jurisdiction. See, e.g. supra Furnish, note 30, at 451;
RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW (2009).
142
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the courts of Navajo Nation148, Ho-Chunk Nation149, and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe150
determine their civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. It concludes with a survey of tribal court decisions
on jurisdiction. These analyses show that Montana and its progeny do not have a significant
influence on how tribal courts determine jurisdiction.
A. A. Navajo Nation
The Navajo Nation’s government has three branches: an executive,151 The Navajo Nation
Council,152 and a Judiciary.153 The Diné, i.e. the Navajo people, and the Nation’s judiciary have
been the subject of significant study.154 Navajo courts are unique, in part, because of how
broadly they apply their jurisdiction. The Navajo Nation’s judiciary notes their “civil jurisdiction
covers all persons (Indian and non-Indian) who reside in Navajo Indian Country or have caused
an action to occur in Navajo Indian Country.”155 The Nation’s courts have emphasized the
authority granted by the Treaty of 1868156 and interpreted the Montana line of cases narrowly,
largely as irrelevant to the Navajo, in order to apply the Nation’s jurisdiction broadly.157 Federal
and state courts describe their jurisdictional inquiry in a personal/subject-matter jurisdiction

This article briefly discusses the Navajo Nation mostly for the sake of comparison, as it is regarded “as the flagship
of American Indian tribal Courts.” Austin, supra note 147, at 18.
149
The author chose the Ho-Chunk Nation primarily because its reservation is in a mandatory PL-280 state. PL-280
transferred federal jurisdiction over most crimes to the specified states. U.S. Att’ys Off. Dist. Minn., Frequently Asked
Questions about Public Law 83-280 (May 1, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/Public-Law%2083-280. PL-280
also “open[ed] the door for Native Americans to file private civil suits in state court” even if the defendant was an
Indian and the action giving rise to suit occurred in Indian Country. Dorothy Alther, An Introduction to Public Law
280, CAL. INDIAN LEGAL SERVS. (Sep. 14, 2020) https://www.calindian.org/an-introduction-into-public-law-280/.
Tribes in PL 280 states thus deal with a different allocation of power in the tri-sovereign framework, in which power
is divided between the federal government, state government, and tribal government.
150
The author chose the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe for the sake of geographic diversity and to add a tribe that is not
in a PL 280 state. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s reservation is in Connecticut. Mashantucket (W.) Pequot Tribal
Nation, About the Mashantucket (Western) Pequot Tribal Nation, https://www.mptn-nsn.gov/default.aspx. Further,
the tribe has a very sophisticated judiciary.
151
Austin, supra note 147, at 17–18. (The Nation’s executive branch is headed by a president whose chief duties
include appointing judges and “directors for several divisions that provide services to the Navajo public”).
152
Id. at 17. (The Navajo Nation Council is the legislative branch, and its “chief duties . . . are to approve a budget for
the Navajo Nation government and to enact legislation”).
153
Id. at 18. (Judges are appointed by the Navajo Nation president and must be confirmed with a unanimous vote by
the Navajo Nation Council).
154
This article does not discuss the Navajo in much depth, because such literature exists. E.g. supra Furnish, note 33,
at 451.
155
Courts & Peacemaking in the Navajo Nation: A Public Guide, Navajo Nation Courts, (last revised Feb. 23, 2021)
(http://www.courts.navajo-nsn.gov/publicguide.htm).
156
Fort Sumner Treaty of 1868, Navajo-U.S., June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
157
Furnish, supra note 33, at 451.
148
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paradigm; but Navajo courts tend to only focus on the personal jurisdiction element, and the
difficult issues that arise with personal jurisdiction over non-Indian parties.158
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The Navajo Nation Code “provides for the broadest possible civil jurisdiction, modeling
its statute on state long-arm statutes.”159 However, the long-arm statute is limited by the Nation’s
due process requirement which “the Navajo Nation must provide . . . through fundamental
fairness and the value of k’é.”160 The Navajo courts due process test is guided by “the ‘minimum
contacts’ requirements of International Shoe . . . .”161 So, the court “ground[s its] analysis in both
[Navajo] laws and the laws of the United States applied in ‘fairness and mutual respect’. . . .”162
The minimum-contacts analyses focus on whether the non-Indian party purposefully availed
itself of the Navajo Nation163 or was on “notice that their activities may lead to suits on the . . .
Navajo Nation.”164
In Nelson v. Pfizer, the Navajo Supreme Court provided “a checklist of ‘several sources’
for tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians: 1) ‘its broad inherent sovereignty over non-Indian
conduct anywhere within its territory;’ 2) ‘federal and state statutes, regulations and
intergovernmental agreements’ delegating such authority; 3) treaties that recognize such
authority; and 4) ‘a tribe's authority as landowner.’”165 The discussion of jurisdiction over nonIndian parties reflects the Court’s primary concern with personal jurisdiction.

158

Begay v. Navajo Engineer & Const. Auth., 10 Am. Tribal L. 45, 47–48 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2011) (citing Navajo
Transport Servs. Inc. v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal L. 516, 519 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2007)); Clark v. Allen, 7 Nav. Rptr. 422
(Nav. Sup. Ct. 1999)) (collecting cases).
159
Furnish, supra note 33, at 437.
160
EXC, Inc. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct. 9 Am. Tribal L. 176 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2010). This paper does not delve deeply into
Navajo Common Law nor underlying principles such as k’é. However, the Judicial Branch briefly explains k’é as
“principles of relationship, courtesy and respect.” Courts & Peacemaking in the Navajo Nation: A Public Guide,
Navajo Nation Courts, (last revised Feb. 23, 2021) (http://www.courts.navajo-nsn.gov/publicguide.html).
161
Ford Motor Co. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct., 7 Am. Tribal L. 652 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2008) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
162
EXC, Inc., 9 Am. Tribal Law at 183 (quoting In Re Est. of Goldtooth Begay #2, 7 Navajo Rptr. 29, 31 (Navajo
1992)).
163
Ford Motor Co., 7 Am. Tribal Law at 658.
164
EXC, Inc., 9 Am. Tribal Law at 183.
165
Furnish, supra note 33, at 440 (quoting Nelson, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 374).
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2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Navajo Courts must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause of action to hear a
case; however, the Navajo courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry is usually cursory.167 The
Navajo Supreme Court has noted “our subject matter jurisdiction over matters occurring on tribal
land is broad;”168 and the Nation’s Long-Arm Statute permits courts to “exercise . . . subject
matter jurisdiction over any non-member who consents to jurisdiction . . . .”169 The Navajo
Supreme Court does not require the specific statute that underlies the cause of action to
“specifically provide for Navajo . . . court jurisdiction.”170 Rather it has held the Long-Arm
Statute is sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction.171
166

3. Montana in Navajo Nation Jurisprudence
The Navajo Nation is unique amongst the tribes analyzed in this article because of the
broad jurisdictional delegation granted in the Treaty of 1868.172 The treaty gave the Navajo
Nation the right to exclude all but certain federal employees from the Nation’s reservation.173
Following from this greater power of exclusion, Navajo courts have found the lesser power of
“condition[ing] the[] presence [of non-Indians to] conformity with [Navajo] laws.”174 Because of
the “express congressional delegation” in the Treaty, Montana does not prevent jurisdiction
“over events occurring and/or parties acting on tribal land.175 However, of the tribes discussed in
detail in this article, the Navajo judiciary has also discussed Montana the most. This is likely
because the Navajo Supreme Court requires district courts to conduct a Montana analysis in

166

Clark v. Allen, 7 Navajo Rptr. 422 (Navajo 1999).
See, e.g., EXC, Inc., 9 Am. Tribal Law at 183 (noting subject matter jurisdiction as one of the questions presented
but focusing on the issue of whether non-Indian defendants were on notice they would be subject to Navajo Nation
jurisdiction).
168
Nelson, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 377.
169
EXC, Inc., 9 Am. Tribal Law at 180.
170
Id. at 184.
171
Id. Subject matter jurisdiction may still present an issue when (1) the Navajo Nation or one of its enterprises is a
defendant; waiver to sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit; Begay v. Navajo Eng'g & Constr.
Auth., 10 Am. Tribal Law 45, 48 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2011); and (2) when the parties lack standing. See e.g., Graven v.
Morgan, 11 Am. Tribal Law 59, 62 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2012).
172
Fort Sumner Treaty of 1868, Navajo-U.S., June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
173
Id. at Art. II.
174
Dale Nicholson Tr. v. Chavez, 8 Navajo Rptr. 417, 429 (Navajo 2004).
175
Supra Furnish, note 33 at 443 (citing Dale Nicholson Tr., 8 Navajo Rptr. at 428). The Navajo Supreme Court based
this on U.S. Supreme Court finding tribal authority in treaties with “almost identical language.” Dale Nicholson Tr.,
8 Navajo Rptr. at 429.
167
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every decision.176 The Navajo judiciary has construed Montana narrowly, finding the Montana
cases mostly constrained to the facts rather than announcing any broad principles.177
The Navajo Supreme Court has mostly considered Montana to relate to personal
jurisdiction178 and has emphasized that Montana only applies in cases where there is no “express
congressional delegation.”179 So, for the Navajo, Montana does not impact jurisdiction “over
events occurring and/or parties acting on tribal land,” because “[t]he Treaty of 1868 preserved
tribal sovereignty by a specific grant of civil jurisdiction requiring only territorial contact,
regardless of who the parties might be.”180 Thus, “Navajo Nation law is clear that the civil
authority of [Navajo] courts to regulate Non-Indian activity within the external territorial
boundaries of the Navajo Nation is absolute and stems from inherent authority as recognized in
the Treaty of 1868.”181
In Allstate Indem. Co. v. Blackgoat, the Navajo Supreme Court discussed the impact of
Montana, and found it relatively insignificant, noting “the Montana test is only relevant within
the Navajo Nation on non-Indian owned fee land or on certain types of right-of-way.”182 As
Professor Furnish noted in his comprehensive overview of the Navajo jurisprudence on
jurisdiction, “[t]he court felt that even if Strate-Montana defined its jurisdiction, the test was not
so restrictive.183 It reasoned that “the actual U.S. Supreme Court test allows jurisdiction if the
asserted jurisdiction has a ‘nexus’ to a consensual relationship.”184 Thus, the Navajo
jurisdictional inquiry is largely divorced from Montana, and instead relies on a minimumcontacts test based in the Nation’s due process.

176

The Navajo Supreme Court requires district courts to do a Montana analysis in all cases and determine whether the
case falls into an exception, because “tribal jurisdiction over non-members is under increasing attack in federal
common law.” Doe BF v. Diocese of Gallup, 10 Am. Tribal L. 72 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2011). However, the Navajo Supreme
Court recognizes the strain on judicial resources the Montana inquiry requires. See, e.g., Nelson, 8 Navajo Rptr. at
375 (declining to extend Montana to activity on tribal land after Hicks); Ford Motor Co., 7 Am. Tribal Law at 660.
177
Furnish, supra note 33, at 442–43 (citing Dale Nicholson Tr., 8 Navajo Rptr. at 428).
178
Furnish, supra note 33, at 440 (quoting Nelson, 8 Navajo Rptr. at 376–77) (discussing Montana as applying to
jurisdiction over parties).
179
Id. at 442–43 (citing Dale Nicholson Tr., 8 Navajo Rptr. at 425).
180
Id. at 443 (citing Dale Nicholson Tr., 8 Navajo Rptr. at 428).
181
John Doe BF, 10 Am. Tribal L. at 78 (collecting cases).
182
6 Am. Tribal L. 637, 641 n.2 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005).
183
Furnish, supra note 33, at 444, (citing Blackgoat, 6 Am. Tribal Law at 641).
184
Id. at 444, (quoting Blackgoat, 6 Am. Tribal L. at 641).
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B. B. The Ho-Chunk Nation: A Focus on Arising Under and Judicial Restraint in Grounds for
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Introduction — Brief Overview of The Ho-Chunk Nation’s Government
The Ho-Chunk Nation’s government is composed of four branches: the General
Council185, the Legislature186, the Executive187, and the Judiciary.188 The Ho-Chunk Nation
(“HCN”) has jurisdiction over “all [of its] territory [as defined in the HCN Constitution] and to
any and all persons or activities therein, based upon the inherent sovereign authority of the
Nation and the People or upon Federal Law.”189 Despite the broad territorial and personal
jurisdiction, the judiciary has limited subject-matter jurisdiction.190
The HCN’s Constitution vests the judiciary with the Nation’s judicial power, including
the “power to interpret and apply the Constitution and laws of the Ho-Chunk Nation.”191 The
Judiciary is composed of five courts,192 but only three courts are relevant for the purposes of this
article: the Trial Court, the Supreme Court, and the Traditional Court.193

The Nation’s General Council is open to all eligible voters of the Nation and is the repository of all of the Nation’s
“inherent sovereign powers.” HCN CONST. ART IV, § 1. And amongst other powers, the General Council retains the
authority to veto any legislative action, reverse judicial interpretations of legislative actions, and set policy for the
Nation. HCN CONST. ART. III, § 3.
186
The legislative branch possesses all of the Nation’s power to make laws and is the source of all causes of action
not established by the Constitution or the Traditional Court. These powers include: “mak[ing] laws”; delegating
legislative powers to the executive branch; managing the Nation’s [budget]; “set[ting] salaries, terms and conditions
of employment for all government personnel;” “negotiat[ing] and enter[ing] into treaties, compacts, contracts, and
agreements with other governments, organizations or individuals;” and issuing charters of incorporation. Id. at § 2.
187
The Ho-Chunk Nation’s Constitution vests the Nation’s President with the Executive power. HCN CONST. ART.
VI, § 1(a). The executive branch is responsible for “execut[ing], administer[ing], and enforc[ing] the laws of the HoChunk Nation necessary to exercise all powers delegated by the General Council and the Legislature . . . .” Id. § 2(l).
Thus, the Executive Branch has the power to create a cause of action where the power has been properly delegated.
Abangan v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep't of Bus., 4 Am. Tribal L. 370 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2003).
188
HCN Const. Art. III, § 2.
189
Id. at ART. I, § 2.
190
See infra Section II.B.2.
191
HCN CONST. ART. VII, § 4.
192
Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary Establishment and Organization Act, 1 HCC § 1, 3.
193
The Constitution only explicitly provides for the creation of the Supreme Court and the Traditional Court, but it
grants the Legislature the power to create other inferior courts, including “other forums of special jurisdiction for
traditional dispute resolution . . . .” HCN CONST. ART. VII § 1. The Traditional Court of the Ho-Chunk Nation was
established by the Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary Establishment and Organization Act, which specifies that the
Traditional Court has the power to determine common law actions based on Ho-Chunk Nation Tradition and Custom.
1 HCC § 1(13); HCN R. CIV. P. 8(B); Gardner v. Littlejohn, 2011 HCN 11-02.
185
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2. The Jurisdictional Inquiry
The HCN’s judiciary uses a subject-matter jurisdiction/personal jurisdiction paradigm
similar to the United States federal and state courts.194 The HCN Long-Arm Ordinance
enumerates the grounds for personal jurisdiction.195 And the HCN courts’ personal jurisdiction is
further restricted by the Due Process Clause in the HCN’s constitution, which has led the
Nation’s trial courts to adopt an International Shoe inspired minimum-contacts standard.196
Additionally, Ho-Chunk Nation courts only have subject matter jurisdiction over cases
arising under HCN law197 This subject-matter requirement is strictly applied and is the primary
reason cases are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.198
As a final constraint, while the Ho-Chunk Nation’s jurisdictional inquiry has developed
largely independent of Montana and its progeny, it still limits the HCN’s jurisdiction.199
However, the constraints imposed by Montana seem only theoretical, as there appears to be no
case in which the HCN courts found they had jurisdiction under HCN law but dismissed a case
on Montana grounds.200
a. Personal Jurisdiction

194

Ho-Chunk Nation v. Steindorf, 2000 HCN SU 00-04, 3–4 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Sep. 29, 2000). Ho-Chunk
Nation v. Olsen discusses in detail the source of the bifurcated jurisdictional inquiry in the Nation’s Constitution. 2
Am. Tribal L. 299, 306 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2000).
195
2 HCC § 15(5).
196
See infra n. 181–90 and accompanying discussion.
197
HCN CONST. ART. VII, § 5(a).
198
See, e.g., Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04; Ho-Chunk Nation Treasury Dep't v. Corvettes on the Isthmus, 2007 HCN
07-03 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2007); Ho-Chunk Nation v. B & K Builders, Inc., 3 Am. Tribal L. 381,
388 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2001).
199
Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 305–06; see infra Section II.B. Related to this discussion, the Teague Protocol governs
how the tribe and states reach agreements when both claim to have jurisdiction. The protocol relies on a multi-factor
balancing test and adds a further quirk to the tribe’s determination that it has jurisdiction. However, this article is
primarily concerned with how the tribes determine their jurisdiction, not what they do if that jurisdictional finding
overlaps with another. So, this article does not go into depth on the Teague Protocol. See, e.g., Carol Tebben,
Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 177 (2002); Robert A. Blaeser & Andrea L. Martin, Engendering Tribal Court/State Court Cooperation, 64
BENCH & BAR MINN. 18, 20–21 (2006); Tonya Kowalski, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Danger and Opportunity in
Tribal-State Court Relations, 47 TULSA L. REV. 687, 706–08 (2012); Paul Stenzel, Full Faith and Credit and
Cooperation between State and Tribal Courts, 2 J. CT. INNOVATION 225, 231–35 (2009).
200
See infra Section II.B.
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HCN courts must have personal jurisdiction over the parties to adjudicate a dispute.201
The personal jurisdiction inquiry is governed by the Ho-Chunk Long-Arm Ordinance, which
enumerates the grounds for personal jurisdiction, and an International Shoe type minimum
contacts inquiry.202 However, a party may consent to the HCN’s personal jurisdiction, even if the
HCN court would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction. 203 This is because “the requirement
of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be
waived.”204 When a party waives their objection to personal jurisdiction, HCN courts do not
require a statutory basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.205
(1) The Long-Arm Ordinance
In 2005, the HCN adopted the Long-Arm Ordinance, which established that the Nation’s
courts “may render a judgement against a party personally only if there exists one or more of the
jurisdictional grounds” listed in the Long-Arm Ordinance.206 So, the first step to determine
whether the court has personal jurisdiction over a party is to look to the HCN Long-Arm
Ordinance. Most statutory grounds for personal jurisdiction only grant specific personal
jurisdiction. Yet, “local presence or status” may grant general personal jurisdiction. 207

201

Long-Arm Ordinance, 2 HCC § 15.4.b.; see also Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 306.
Long-Arm Ordinance, 2 HCC § 15.5 (a–h). The Ordinance also provides for In Rem and Quasi in Rem proceedings,
but the author did not find any cases discussing these proceedings.
203
Ho-Chunk Nation v. Peterson, 14 Am. Tribal L. 337, 344 n.4 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2010).
204
Id.
205
See, e.g., id. at 343–44; Ho-Chunk Nation v. Ind. Recycling & Renewable Fuels, LLC, 14 Am. Tribal L. 361, 367–
68 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2011); Redacted v. Redacted, 2016 HCN 15-13, *6 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. May
5, 2016).
206
Long-Arm Ordinance, 2 HCC § 15 4.b. There are 21 grounds for establishing personal jurisdiction under the LongArm Ordinance. Id. at 5.a.–h. To establish personal jurisdiction on these grounds, a party must be properly served
pursuant to the Long-Arm Ordinance, id. at 4.b.(1–2), and have at least one statutory ground for jurisdiction. Id. at
4.b. The grounds for personal jurisdiction mostly fall into eight categories as provided for in the statute: 1) general
personal jurisdiction based on local status, which includes all members of the HCN, id. at 5.a.; 2) specific personal
jurisdiction for actions or omissions that occurred on the Nation’s lands, id. at 5.c; 3) specific personal jurisdiction for
actions off of the Nation’s land that cause injury on the Nation’s lands, id. at 5.d.; 4) specific personal jurisdiction for
disputes over local contracts, id. at 5.e.; 5) specific personal jurisdiction for disputes over local services or goods, id.;
6) specific personal jurisdiction for disputes over real property on the land of the Nation, id. at 5.f–g; 7) specific
personal jurisdiction for disputes over tangible property on the land of the Nation, id. (personal jurisdiction exists over
a defendant who is sued for “return[], restor[ation] or account[ing]” of “any asset or thing of value [] on the lands of
the Nation at the time the defendant acquired possession.”); and 8) specific personal jurisdiction over insurance
disputes involving a Ho-Chunk member or when the event occurred on the lands of the Nation. Id. at 5.h. Additionally,
personal jurisdiction exists when the Nation’s laws “specifically confer[] grounds for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” Id. at 5.b. However, there is no pendent jurisdiction in the HCN, and the court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant for the purposes of the specific claim. Id. at 5.j.
207
Id.
202
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(2) The Minimum Contacts Inquiry
The Ho-Chunk Supreme Court has not addressed issues of personal jurisdiction in
detail, but the trial court has analyzed it on a number of occasions. The Nation’s trial court
adopted an International Shoe minimum-contacts requirement based on the Due Process Clause
in the HCN Constitution. 209 A couple of cases have acknowledged the continued importance of
the minimum contacts test after the Long-Arm Ordinance,210 but the most in-depth treatment of
the test is found in Olsen, a case decided before the Long-Arm Ordinance was enacted.211
208

In Olsen, the HCN Department of Justice sued Ross Olsen, a non-Indian, to recover
$87,120 the Nation paid him as a down payment for 48,000 cartons of cigarettes after Olsen
failed to deliver the cigarettes.212 Olsen had approached the HCN’s representatives to propose the
deal. Olsen engaged in extended negotiations with HCN representatives within the “sovereign
lands of the Ho-Chunk Nation” and signed a written purchase agreement with HCN
representatives on HCN trust land.213 Olsen did not respond to the complaint against him in tribal
court, so the court entered a default judgement against him.214 The court in Olsen then had to
determine whether it had jurisdiction.215 The court focused on “the defendant purposefully
engag[ing] with the Ho-Chunk Nation,” and premised personal jurisdiction on the defendant
“purposely avail[ing himself] of the chance to do business in the forum state.”216 The pre-Long-

The HCN’s Supreme Court has addressed personal jurisdiction in a few instances but not in detail. In Redacted v.
Redacted, the Supreme Court found the defendant “consented to personal jurisdiction by his participation in th[e]
lengthy suit.” 2016 HCN SU 15-13, *6 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. May 5, 2016). And in Ho-Chunk Nation v. Bank
of Am., the Supreme Court deferred to the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction and briefly discussed the issue
in the context of Montana and Strate. No. SU 03-06, 2003 Ho-Chunk Supreme LEXIS 3, *13–14 (Sup. Ct. Sep. 11,
2003) (citations omitted).
209
Ho-Chunk Nation v. Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. 299, 306–07 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2000). The trial courts first
adopted the test in Olsen, before the Nation’s Long-Arm Ordinance was enacted. Id. The trial courts affirmed the
minimum contacts test after the Nation adopted the Long-Arm Ordinance. See, e.g., Ho-Chunk Nation v. Peterson, 14
Am. Tribal L. at 343–44. Since this article is on tribal approaches to adjudicatory jurisdiction rather than personal
jurisdiction generally, it does not discuss International Shoe outside of the brief summary above. See, supra § I.C.
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See, e.g., Peterson, 14 Am. Tribal L. at 343–44; Ind. Recycling & Renewable Fuels, 14 Am. Tribal L. at 367–68
(citations omitted).
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Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 307.
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Id. at 300.
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Id. at 303.
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Id. at 300.
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Id.
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Id. at 307, (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)). The Ho-Chunk Supreme Court compared its
reasoning to that “in the McGee line of cases,” premising personal jurisdiction on the defendant’s purposeful availment
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Arm Ordinance personal jurisdiction inquiry in Olsen focused on the connection to the lands of
the nation.217 In Olsen, the defendant’s contacts were based on activities that took place on the
lands of the nation.218 The court found that the defendant “purposefully engaged in contact with
the Ho-Chunk Nation for the purpose of doing business” so it was “reasonable and fair for him to
be haled into the Ho-Chunk Nation’s courts to answer the plaintiff’s claims . . . .”219
The Ho-Chunk Supreme Court has not yet explicitly adopted the minimum contacts test,
and only that Court’s decisions are binding in the HCN.220 However, the HCN Supreme Court
has accepted use of the test,221 and International Shoe’s minimum contacts test is well grounded
in the Nation’s jurisprudence.
b. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
HCN courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and can only hear cases arising under HoChunk Nation’s “Constitution, laws, customs, [or] traditions . . . .”222 The Nation’s courts have
interpreted this as limiting causes of actions to three grounds: 1) the Nation’s constitution,223 2)

of the forum state. Id. The citation to McGee is admittedly confusing, as the term “purposeful availment” first entered
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Burger King v. Rudzewicz. 461 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). This confusion is
compounded because the court focuses on the defendant’s presence on tribal land and engaging in conduct on tribal
land, but “purposeful availment” is primarily concerned with cases where the defendants did not “physically enter the
forum state.” Id. But, regardless of the specific case the trial court focused on, the trial court practice suggests a
wholesale adoption of “International Shoe . . . and its progeny,” at least up to 2011, when the trial court last cited
International Shoe. Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 306–07; Ind. Recycling & Renewable Fuels, LLC, 14 Am. Tribal L. at
367–68 (citations omitted).
217
Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 306–07. This focus suggests that one of the reasons the Minimum Contacts test has
diminished in importance is the Long-Arm Ordinance which provides specific bases for personal jurisdiction. Until
the Long-Arm Ordinance, the courts looked to the Judiciary Act of 1995 for guidance in determining personal
jurisdiction, which stated, in relevant part, “[t]his jurisdiction extends over the Nation and its territory, persons who
enter its territory, its members, and persons who interact with the nation wherever found.” Id. at 306 (citing to HoChunk Nation Judiciary Act of 1995, HCC 95-010 (2) (superseded by statute Ho-Chunk Nation Judiciary
Establishment and Organization Act, 1 HCC § 1 (2005))). The superseding Ho-Chunk Judiciary Establishment and
Organization Act uses the same language in describing the courts’ jurisdiction. 1 HCC § 1.4 (2005).
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Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. at 306–07.
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Id.
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Lonetree v. Funmaker, Jr., 2001 HCN SU 00-16, 4–5 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2001).
221
In Bank of America, the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court included “contacts or lack of contacts with the Nation” as an
important part of the record in a “challenge to jurisdiction.” Ho-Chunk Nation v. Bank of Am., No. SU 03-06, 2003
Ho-Chunk Supreme LEXIS 3, *12 n.5 (Sup. Ct. Sep. 11, 2003). While not directly applying the minimum contacts
test, nor citing International Shoe, this suggests that the Supreme Court at least considers a lack of minimum contacts
to be grounds for objecting to personal jurisdiction.
222
HCN CONST. ART. VII, § 5(a).
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the Laws of the Nation based in an exercise of the legislature’s power,224 and 3) the Nation’s
common law, as articulated by the Traditional Court.225
HCN courts rarely discuss subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Constitution, but one
example of subject matter jurisdiction granted by the Constitution is “Challenges of Election
Results,” which the Nation’s “Trial Court shall hear and decide.”226 Because HCN courts rarely
discuss the constitution as grounds for subject matter jurisdiction, this article focuses on the latter
two grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction.
(1) Laws of the Nation
The “laws of the nation” requirement in Ho-Chunk Nation’s subject-matter jurisdiction
jurisprudence stems from the principle articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia, that “tribes have the inherent right to make their own laws and to be ruled
by them.”227 The jurisdictional test under this branch boils down to the simple question: "is there
a tribal law or act by the legislature that applies?” When there is a legislative act that applies to a
case, the HCN courts have subject-matter jurisdiction.228 However, where there is “no law to
which the [HCN courts] can apply to [a] case,” the courts do not have subject-matter
jurisdiction.229 And Ho-Chunk courts have repeatedly made clear that where the applicable law is
state law, the HCN courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, unless incorporated into Ho-Chunk
law by a legislative act.230 When the Legislature explicitly adopts foreign law, as in a choice of
law clause in a written contract, HCN courts will apply that law. Thus, in Bank of America, the
HCN Supreme Court applied New York law pursuant to a New York choice of law clause,
because when “the Legislature entered into the [contract, it] elevat[ed] its terms and conditions to
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Ho-Chunk Nation Child & Fam. Servs. v. Redacted, 2015 HCN SU 14-06, *2 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Apr. 7,
2015) (“In most instances the Court must either discern or verify whether the Ho-Chunk Legislature has ‘enacted a
law to which the HCN Trial Court can apply to [a] case’”) (quoting Ho-Chunk Nation v. Steindorf, 2000 HCN 0004).
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. 299, 307 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2000). The Traditional Court is
composed of Ho-Chunk Nation Elders. 1 HCC § 1 3.c. And a more thorough discussion of the court can be found in
Daniel Snyder’s Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Law Profile. Snyder, supra note 41, at 4.
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HCN CONST. ART. VIII, § 7.
227
Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04, 5 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1831).
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Redacted v. Redacted, 2016 HCN 15-13. The names of the parties are redacted so the author identifies the parties
as appellant and appellee.
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Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04, 5.
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Money Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 9 Am. Tribal L. 308, 314–315 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2010)
(citing Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04, 5). See also, Long-Arm Ordinance, 2 HCC § 15 3.d., 4.a. (Ho-Chunk Nation
courts “may entertain a civil action only when it has subject matter jurisdiction” and “subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred by the Constitution and laws of the Nation and by statutes of the United States”).
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the status of substantive law, including the incorporation of the ‘laws of the State of New
York.’”231
When the law provides a cause of action, HCN courts apply it. This includes statutes
enacted by the legislature232, as well as other legislative actions. The quirk in this “law”
component of subject-matter jurisdiction is that, under the HCN constitution, the legislature has
responsibility to enter contracts and manage employees.233 As a result, HCN Courts have
recognized both contracts234 and personnel manuals235 as equivalent to statutory law. Any use of
the legislative power may provide a “law” that grants HCN courts subject-matter jurisdiction.
This basis for subject-matter jurisdiction depends on whether an exercise of the Legislature’s
powers provide a cause of action.
Despite this relatively loose definition of “law”, the HCN courts strictly apply the “laws
of the nation” requirement and will dismiss cases unless there is a law duly enacted by the
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Bank of Am., 6 Am. Tribal L. 275, 285, 292 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2006) (court had
jurisdiction when applicable law was New York law because the contract was entered into by the legislature, and the
contract specified New York law applied. So, for the purpose of the contract, New York law was Ho-Chunk law.
232
See, e.g., Redacted, 2016 HCN 15-13, *5 (holding the Elder Protection Act, a statute that “protect[s] elders from
exploitation,” provided subject matter jurisdiction). The case dealt with a dispute over an undisputed, substantial debt
owed by appellant to appellee. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court’s finding that “[appellant’s] failure to
abide by a binding promise to reimburse the [appellee] for accumulated charges constitutes exploitation;” and thus,
per the statute, “‘the court has jurisdiction to hear a cause of action for protection,’ [addressing] subject matter
jurisdiction [as] it speaks to the source of law from which the court’s power of review derives, namely the elder
protection act”. Id. at 5–6.
233
HCN CONST. ART. V, § 2(i).
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Bank of Am., 6 Am. Tribal L. 275, 292 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2006). See also HoChunk Nation, Bus. Dep’t v. Ind. Recycling & Renewable Fuels, LLC, 14 Am. Tribal L. 361, 367 (Ho-Chunk Nation
Trial Ct. 2011) (“a written contract or agreement executed by the nation [is] presumptively regard[ed] as an equivalent
to statutory law”). Contracts may grant subject-matter jurisdiction even where the applicable law is not originally HoChunk law. So, a choice of law provision in a contract between the HCN and a third party provided the HCN courts
with subject-matter jurisdiction because the courts had a law to apply, namely New York law. Bank of Am., 6 Am.
Tribal L. at 285, 292. When “the Legislature entered into the [contract, it] elevat[ed] its terms and conditions to the
status of substantive law, including the incorporation of the ‘laws of the State of New York.’” Id. at 292.
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Lang, 2 Am. Tribal L. 233, 243 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 1999) (“The plaintiff offered this
civil action under the tribal laws of the Ho-Chunk Nation, specifically the HCN Personnel Manual” these are “laws to
govern employment by the Nation . . . .”). The court in Steindorf further clarified that the cause of action in Lang that
provided subject matter jurisdiction was the “specific violation of the HCN Personnel Policy and Procedure Manual.”
Ho-Chunk Nation v. Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04, 4. See also Abangan v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep’t of Bus., 4 Am.
Tribal L. 370, 385 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2003) (more recently recognizing the personnel manual as a valid use
of the legislative power but dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the “clear language of the
personnel manual” did not provide a proper delegation of the legislative power to the executive branch. The court
entertained an argument that the personnel manual delegated legislative power and rejected it because “[t]he clear
language of the Personnel manual does not support” the delegation but did not consider the personnel manual different
from other uses of the legislative power).
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legislature, or a recognized tradition or custom that provides a cause of action.236 As articulated
in the seminal Steindorf case, when “[t]he HCN Legislature have not enacted a law to which the
HCN Trial Court can apply to th[e] case . . . the HCN lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”237 In
Corvettes, the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court dismissed a case that involved an oral contract because
there was “no statute of frauds, no uniform commercial code to apply,”238 and no cause of action
in HCN common law.239 Thus, the court could not hear a suit in equity, primarily because the
remedy, “damages, measured in monetary terms . . . is still fundamentally a legal remedy which
requires the Court[]s to have substantive law to apply.”240 The court refused to “exercise its
jurisdiction in the absence of contract,” as “[i]t is not for the Court[s] to make positive law.”241
This judicial minimalism typifies HCN jurisprudence in subject-matter jurisdiction.
When cases come to the courts and the statutory framework is not clearly applicable, the
courts frequently dismiss for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For example, in HCN Child &
Family Services v. Redacted, the HCN Supreme Court addressed a dispute that fell under the
HCN’s Children’s Act.242 However, the appellant in the case aged out of the statute’s coverage
after the appellant filed their reply brief at the HCN Supreme Court.243 Since the statute provided
the jurisdictional underpinning, and the “jurisdictional underpinning must continue to exist at
every stage of litigation . . . the Supreme Court lacked constitutional authority to further entertain
the merits of the appeal.”244 So, even though the appellant had a cause of action when the HCN
Supreme Court granted the appeal, the “continuing jurisdiction of the Court [] terminate[d]”
when “the subject child bec[ame] eighteen years of age.”245

Abangan v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep’t of Bus., 4 Am. Tribal L. 370, 384 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2003). In state
and federal law, courts have the power to articulate common law and establish causes of action. However, in the HoChunk Nation, the common law is articulated by the Traditional Court, so the Trial Court and Supreme Court do not
have the power to create grounds for a suit where none exist.
237
Steindorf, 2000 HCN 00-04, at 5.
238
Although the Ho-Chunk Nation has adopted a Uniform Commercial Code, the court in Corvettes found “its breadth
so truncated as to be nearly useless” and inapplicable to the case. Corvettes on the Isthmus, 2007 HCN 07-03, 2 n.1.
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Id. at 2–3.
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Id. at 3.
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Id. at 3–4.
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2015 HCN 14-06, 3 (internal citation omitted).
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Id. It is difficult to be certain of this, but it seems the appellant aged out of the statute’s coverage between the filing
of their reply brief and the court’s decision.
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Id. (quoting 4 HCC § 3.7a(1)).
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Similarly, the HCN Supreme Court dismissed cases in which the property in question was
not clearly within statutory coverage,246 and where the HCN had not passed a probate code to
apply to the case.247
(2) Common Law — Customs and Traditions
In addition to the Constitution and laws of the HCN, their “customs[] and traditions”
provide grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction.248 Ho-Chunk customs and traditions are the
Nation’s common law, distinct from “English or American common law causes of action.”249
The Nation’s common law is not pronounced by the Trial Court nor the Supreme Court, but by
the Traditional Court, upon certification of a question by the Trial Court.250 These “decision[s].
rendered by the elders in [] Traditional Court [are] final and cannot be appealed.” 251 The court
may certify a question at the request of the parties or on its own volition. 252 This certification
“procedure is analogous to the ‘certification of questions of law’ that often takes place between
federal and state courts.”253 In Gardner I, the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court recognized there are “no
provisions in Ho-Chunk law on how trial courts are to utilize the Traditional Court . . . .”254
However, it held that the Due Process Clause in the Nation’s constitution required certain
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Funmaker v. Funmaker, 2016 HCN SU 15-11, *8 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. May 16, 2006).
Redacted v. Ho-Chunk Nation Off. of Tribal Enrollment, 2012 HCN SU 12-05, *3 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct.
Dec. 18, 2012). An interesting twist on this came in Money Centers of America, there the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court
held that there was no tort cause of action in the case even though the legislature had enacted a statute of limitations
for tort claims. Ho-Chunk Nation v. Money Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 9 Am. Tribal L. 308, 315 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct.
2010). Specifically, although the HCN Supreme Court recognized that tort claims are permitted in the HCN, “there
are very few torts [] the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over.” Id. The court held that “articulating a statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense is not the same as conferring subject matter jurisdiction” and the legislature would
need to enact “laws conferring jurisdiction on [the] Court over the [specific] tort claims [at issue].” Id. The Trial Court
also recognized that there would be a valid cause of action if the “Traditional Court [] articulated such claims as arising
from tradition and custom . . . [for] the Supreme Court and Trial Court [to adopt].” Id. However, as the Traditional
Court had “never articulated such claims” there was no subject matter jurisdiction from HCN common law. Thus, the
legislature must specifically articulate a law to be applied to the case for HCN courts to have subject matter
jurisdiction.
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procedures when the Traditional Court rules on a certified question.255 The question the
Traditional Court faces when deciding to certify an action at common law is whether historically
“in the tradition and custom of the Ho-Chunk Nation [the claim] existed . . . .”256
The HCN Supreme and Trial Courts must apply tradition and custom based causes of
action strictly as articulated by the Traditional Court, such causes of action must be specifically
certified by the Traditional Court257 Neither the Supreme nor Trial court can extend causes of
action certified by the Traditional Court, even if the claim is a logical outgrowth.258 So, while
parties can sue for breach of contract under custom and tradition,259 they cannot sue in the
absence of a signed contract,260 or under promissory estoppel.261 And, the trial court cannot “go
beyond the . . . certified question” when it asks the Traditional Court to articulate the custom and
tradition of the Nation.262 Once the Traditional Court pronounces a cause of action as existing
under tradition, courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over the issue, as it arises under HoChunk tradition or custom.263
c. Montana in Ho-Chunk Jurisprudence
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Id. at 6. When the Trial Court consults with the Traditional Court to determine whether a claim arises under HoChunk tradition or custom, the consultations “must be done in open court on the record” with an opportunity for parties
“to ask questions to clarify what [the elders] are saying.” Id. Further, the question certified to the Traditional Court
“must be in writing and provided to the parties in advance of the hearing.” Id. And, if the Traditional Court addresses
the court in Ho-Chunk, an interpreter is required. Id.
256
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also, Brown v. Webster, 2007 HCN SU 06-03, *3 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2007) (“the Ho-Chunk Nation
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Throughout their well-developed jurisprudence that determines HCN court’s civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the HCN courts have considered the Montana framework. HCN courts
recognize Montana and its progeny “determine[ their] adjudicatory jurisdiction.”264 HCN courts
also recognize the Nation’s “constitutional text conditionally premises the exercise of personal
jurisdiction ‘upon Federal law’ thereby requiring a cursory examination of the acknowledged
breadth of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction” under Supreme Court precedent.265 Ho-Chunk
courts have mostly applied Montana as a matter of personal jurisdiction, but have noted it
incorporates both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.266 Further, the courts have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of National Farmers’ exhaustion requirement.267
In Bank of America, the Ho-Chunk Supreme Court discussed Montana after the United
States Supreme Court decided Strate and Hicks.268 In Bank of America, a case involving a
dispute over an interest rate swap agreement as part of a large financial transaction, the HoChunk Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court’s finding that the defendant, Bank of America,
was subject to the tribe’s jurisdiction.269 The court distinguished Bank of America from Strate by
focusing on the non-Indian character of parties in Strate.270 According to the Ho-Chunk Supreme
Court, in Strate, the only connection to the tribe was that the defendant “non-tribal member
entity . . . had subcontracted with a tribal corporation . . . .”271 However, in Bank of America, “it
[was] the Nation, not a sub-contracted non-Indian entity, that [had] directly entered into a
consensual agreement with the [non-Indian party].”272 Thus the consensual relationship with the
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tribal forum did not arise out of a tenuous connection via a sub-contract but through the nonIndian party’s direct commercial relationship with the tribe. Further, “the Bank’s transaction with
the Nation bears directly on the use and disposition of tribal resources (money) and concerns
tribal affairs.”273 The court also focused on the fact that the commercial transaction at issue was
“the result of [the bank’s] consensual relationship with the tribe.”274 This is similar to the United
States Supreme Court’s later requirement in Plains Commerce that analysis of the non-Indians’
contacts with the tribe be limited to “the activities” at issue in the case and not the overall
contacts between the non-Indian party and the tribe.275
The court found that both Montana exceptions applied.276 The “consensual relationships”
exception applied because Bank of America consensually entered into a business transaction
with the tribe “to hedge against the risk of fluctuating interest rates” for an underlying credit
agreement of $45,000,000.277 The “direct threat” exception was also met because “the nonmembers are engaging in activities which directly affect the economic security of the Tribe, and
which may arguably affect the political integrity, health, and welfare of the Tribe as well.”278
The Ho-Chunk Trial Court has discussed the Montana framework post-Plains Commerce
on two occasions.279 In those cases, the HCN Trial Court has shifted towards viewing Montana
and its progeny as similar to the personal jurisdiction inquiry.280 Further, the Trial Court has
suggested that an objection to jurisdiction based on Montana can be waived, citing the United
States Supreme Court’s precedent on personal jurisdiction.281 The Trial Court has recognized
“the federal inquiry incorporates elements traditionally associated with both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction.”282 However, it has also pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s
“hesitancy” “to comment upon the impact a waiver can have on tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
despite acknowledging ‘that most parties acquiesce to tribal jurisdiction.’”283 This stands at odds
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with the Supreme Court’s more recent holding in Hicks that “Strate’s limitations on jurisdiction
over nonmembers pertains to subject-matter rather than merely personal jurisdiction . . . ;”284 and
raises a further issue as subject-matter “jurisdiction otherwise lacking cannot be conferred by
consent, [or] waiver . . . .”285
The apparent inconsistency might be solved by seeing non-response or failure to object to
jurisdiction as tacit agreement to the allegations in the pleading, which includes the allegations
that establish jurisdiction.286 However, this stands in contrast with the HCN courts’ frequent sua
sponte dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and strict requirement that subject-matter
jurisdiction be present at every stage of litigation.287 As a result, the role of Montana in the
Nation’s jurisprudence is unclear. Yet the trial courts have focused their inquiry into the
consensual relationships exception to a minimum contacts test that “resembles the Court’s Due
Process Clause analysis for purposes of personal jurisdiction.”288
Montana and its progeny play a relatively small role in the Ho-Chunk Nation’s civil
jurisdiction jurisprudence. The HCN courts have recognized that the United States Supreme
Court’s precedent in the area “erect the metes and bounds of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction.”289
However, there seem to be no cases in which Montana barred jurisdiction even though the
HCN’s courts found jurisdiction was proper under the Nation’s precedent. Further support for the
claim that the HCN’s jurisdiction jurisprudence is largely divorced from Montana and its
progeny is that the HCN Constitution, including the “arising under” requirement for subjectmatter jurisdiction was adopted in 1994,290 well before the United States Supreme Court’s
statement in 2001 that “tribal courts are [not] courts of ‘general jurisdiction.’”291 Thus, the
limited jurisdiction that the HCN courts exercised was not based on any external limit by the
United States Supreme Court, but was because of tribal law.
Montana is not absent from the Ho-Chunk jurisprudence. As indicated in Olsen, the
Supreme Court’s decisions “determine [the Ho-Chunk Nation’s courts’] adjudicatory
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jurisdiction.” 292 However, there is no evidence that Montana plays a role in the jurisdictional
inquiry in practice.
C. C. The Mashantucket (Western) Pequot Tribal Nation (“Mashantucket”): Limited Legislative
Courts
1. Overview of Mashantucket Government and Judiciary
The Mashantucket Constitution only established a Tribal Council and an Elder
Council.293 The Tribal Council is the governing body of the Mashantucket Tribe and has the
power to “authorize the formation of committees to carry out its duties . . . [that will] consider or
investigate, or take action in regards to those matters assigned to it by the Tribal Council.”294
“Tribal Council committees are subordinate to the Tribal Council” and the Council “delegate[s]
authority to each Committee at its discretion. . . .”295
The Tribal Council established the Tribal Court and Court of Appeals in 1992.296 The
Tribal Court and Court of Appeals are not the only courts in the Mashantucket judiciary; rather,
there are several courts for different subjects. Thus, the Mashantucket Code notes, the tribal
court only has “subject matter jurisdiction over civil causes of action and criminal matters as
expressly conferred upon it by the Tribal Council . . . .”297
2. The Jurisdictional Inquiry in Tribal Court
The Mashantucket courts use a subject-matter jurisdiction/personal jurisdiction paradigm
and require a statute to grant the court both. The Nation’s courts are courts of “limited
jurisdiction, [so] an expressed grant of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the court’s exercise of
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Ho-Chunk Nation v. Olsen, 2 Am. Tribal L. 299, 305 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2000).
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT CONST., Art. VI, Art. XII. The Elder Council has powers over membership and
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Id. at Art. VI § 8.
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jurisdiction.”298 The question often becomes “whether the Tribal Council, as the Tribe’s
governing body, intended that the tribal court have jurisdiction over [the] asserted claim . . . .”299
a. Personal Jurisdiction
The personal jurisdiction analysis in Mashantucket jurisprudence is primarily a question
of whether it is authorized by statute.300 This inquiry is further complicated by the
Mashantucket’s explicit focus on ensuring sufficient notice as a jurisdictional prerequisite.301
Generally, personal jurisdiction is less of an issue in Mashantucket jurisprudence where the
defendant is properly served,302 as consent to Tribal jurisdiction is a requirement for many
activities on the reservation, such as gaming. Additionally, defendants rarely challenge the
authority of the Tribal Court to actually hear the dispute.303 As the Tribal Court has noted
“[c]onsidering the [tribe’s] sovereign immunity from civil suits outside of [the tribal] forum, one
might question the logic of challenging personal jurisdiction” when a nontribal defendant asserts
counterclaims.304
b. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The Mashantucket courts were established by the Nation’s legislature, rather than its
constitution, so the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction is “similar to that of lower federal courts,
whose jurisdiction ‘is limited to those subject matters encompassed within the statutory grant of
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Charles v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 6 Mashantucket Rep. 139, 142 (Tribal Ct. 2014) (citing Milios v.
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Comm’n, 3 Mash. App. 12 (Ct. App., 2001)).
299
Milios, 3 Mash. App. at 15.
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Civil Actions, 12 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 1.c. See also e.g., HKS, Inc. v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 5 Mash.
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merits).
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See e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v. Tahajian, 3 Mash. Rep. 257, 258 (Tribal Ct. 2000) (granting
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denying the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds was “consistent with the tribal policy of resolving suits on the
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See e.g., Barbosa v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 4 Mash. Rep. 269, 274 (Tribal Ct. 2005) (only discussing
proper service in determining the court had personal jurisdiction over defendants who visited the tribe’s casino).
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See e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation v. Paul Steelman, Ltd., 5 Mash. Rep. 31, 34 (Tribal Ct. 2008)
(discussing the tribal court’s authority over contract disputes to which the Nation is a party and noting the Defendant
did not object to the tribal court’s authority).
It may be unusual that there appears to be no case challenging the Mashantucket tribal or appellate courts’ assertion
of personal jurisdiction. However, this may simply be a consequence of the strict limits on the courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction is. See, infra § III.C.2.b.
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authority.’”305 Further, since the Tribal Court is not the only court within the tribe’s judiciary, it
is limited by the jurisdiction of other Mashantucket courts.306
The Mashantucket courts once interpreted their jurisdiction broadly, holding they were a
“separate independent branch of government empowered with original and general jurisdiction
over all civil matters under tribal law.”307 This case soon became anti-canon, as “in 1999, [after
Healy I], the tribal council enacted [section 2(a) of the Judiciary Code] to limit the Court’s
jurisdiction to only that which the Tribal Council had specifically and expressly granted to the
Court.”308
In 1999, in the seminal case Healy II, the Court of Appeals reversed course, and
established the principle the Tribal Court is “a ‘legislative court’ . . . empowered to exercise only
that jurisdiction conferred upon it by the tribe’s governing body.”309 This holding remains a
guiding principle in the Mashantucket jurisprudence.310 Further, because the court is subordinate
to the legislature, to exercise jurisdiction, the Court “must find that the specific cause of action
being alleged was expressly conferred upon the Court by the Tribal Council through the
enactment of Tribal Law.”311 Fundamentally, the Tribal Court is limited by “the cardinal
principle of legislative supremacy” and must “determine the claims ‘at their essence’” to ensure
the tribal court was actually granted jurisdiction.312
The Tribal Court has “jurisdiction over all civil causes of action[,]” “except as [] limited
by tribal or federal law.”313 However, the court’s jurisdiction is not as broad as it first appears.
The same section of the Civil Code that provides the broad grant of jurisdiction has four
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exceptions,314 and courts have cautioned against reading the grant of jurisdiction over “all civil
causes of action” too broadly.315
The Tribal Court’s limited jurisdiction is underpinned by two other components of
Mashantucket law. First, the Tribal Court is not the sole repository of the tribe’s judicial power,
but is one court amongst several. And second, jurisdiction over the tribe and tribal entities is
dependent on a specific waiver of sovereign immunity via statute. There are four316 other judicial
bodies in the Mashantucket government that play crucial roles in limiting the Tribal Court’s
jurisdiction: the Gaming Commission317, the Probate Court318, the Family Court319, and the
Elders Council.320
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Id. at § 1.d. Specifically, the Mashantucket Tribal Courts do not have jurisdiction: (1) Over disputes involving
contracts made with the tribe, when the contract “contains an express provision prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction
by the tribal court.” Id. at § 1.d.(1); (2) Where sovereign immunity acts as a bar to jurisdiction, as the above grant of
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gaming disputes are “specifically reserved for consideration by the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Commission Id. at
§ 1.d.(3); (4) Over causes of action “relating to, or which may affect, banishments or exclusions,” but the tribal court
has jurisdiction to enforce banishment and exclusion orders. Id. at § 1.d.(4).
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the Peacemakers.” JUDICIARY CODE, 1 M.P.T.L. ch. 4 § 1.b. Further, the Peacemakers have limited original
jurisdiction, mostly relying on other governmental entities referring matters to it. Id.
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GAMING LAW, 3 M.P.T.L. ch. 1. § 6–7 (the Gaming Commission has jurisdiction over penalties and complaints
arising under gaming issues); Civil Actions, 12 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 1.d.3. (“there shall be no cause of action in the tribal
court for alleged gaming losses).
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PROBATE LAW, 24 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 2 (Probate Court is a division of the tribal court and has jurisdiction over all
inheritance and probate matters arising within the reservation, and all tribal lands, and “inheritance and probate related
matters involving or pertaining to tribal members and their families who receive benefits and services from the
Tribe.”).
319
CHILD WELFARE, 5 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 3 (Family Court is a division of the tribal court with “exclusive jurisdiction
over any child custody proceeding involving a Child who resides, or is domiciled, within the Mashantucket Pequot
Reservation, settlement area, or trust lands, or a Child who is a ward of the court”). The family court also has
jurisdiction over “all family relations affecting or involving a tribal member . . . and all other matters within the
jurisdiction of the tribal court concerning Children or family relations.” Family Relations, 6 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 2.a.
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HCN CONST. Art. XII § 1 (Elders Council has authority to “review and determine all applications for membership
. . . ;” “hear and decide any matter referred to it by the Tribal Council, and such. Decisions shall be final and not
subject to . . . appeal;” “hear and determine any matter concerning [] banishment or exclusion . . . and the removal of
any Tribal benefits and membership privileges”); Civil Actions, 12 M.P.T.L. ch. 1 § 1.d.4 (“there shall be no cause of
action in the tribal court relating to, or which may affect, banishments or exclusions” except for violation of such a
banishment or exclusion order). See, Charles v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 6 Mash. Rep. 139, 144 (Tribal
Ct. 2014) (dismissing a matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction partly because “the claim relates to the banishment
by the Elders. [And t]he Tribal Council has clearly expressed its legislative intent to exclude from the jurisdiction of
the Tribal Court actions ‘relating to, or which may affect, banishments . . . .’”).
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The Tribal Court’s jurisdiction over the tribe’s agencies is limited. As litigants are
typically required to exhaust administrative remedies before they can appeal administrative
decisions to the Tribal Court.321 Such final administrative decisions are generally only appealable
to the Tribal Court of Appeals, not the Tribal Court.322
A second key limiting principle in the Mashantucket jurisdictional inquiry, is that the
Tribal Court “has jurisdiction over the Tribe and tribal enterprises only where the Tribal Council
has expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity from suit . . . .”323 The Tribal
Council has waived the tribe’s sovereign immunity for a number of claims.324 However, lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction operates as a bar on the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction; and coupled with a
presumption against waiver,325 results in a number of cases dismissed on this ground.326
The Tribal Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that requires an explicit grant of
jurisdiction, and its subject matter jurisdiction analysis is best analogized to lower federal
courts.327
c. Montana in the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
The Mashantucket Tribal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, but their limitations
are independent of Montana. The only cases in the Supreme Court’s Montana saga that have
been cited in the Mashantucket courts’ published cases are National Farmers Union and Iowa
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Mutual, which established the Supreme Court’s exhaustion requirement.328 These cases have
been cited in discussions of the tribal exhaustion requirement329 and in recognizing that “[o]ne of
the essential elements in the exercise of tribal sovereignty is to regulate the activities of persons
on tribal lands and to provide a viable forum for the administration of justice among members
and non-members.”330 Notably though, no Mashantucket decision since Husband v. Wife in 2003
has cited to Montana or its progeny.
The relative independence of the Mashantucket Pequot’s jurisprudence from Montana is
best seen in Milios. In that case, the Mashantucket Court of Appeals relied on United States
Supreme Court precedent regarding the jurisdictional reach of lower federal courts. The tribe’s
Court of Appeals analogized its reach to those courts.331 Further, the court in Milios refused to
exercise jurisdiction because of the absence of a legislative grant, despite recognizing Montana
and its progeny left the court with sufficient adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear the case, had the
legislature authorized it.332
The jurisdiction of Mashantucket Pequot courts is limited by Montana and its progeny,333
but as in the other tribes discussed it rarely enters discussions regarding the court’s jurisdiction.
And the Mashantucket courts determine their jurisdiction independent of Montana, finding their
jurisdiction relatively narrow because of the Tribe’s governmental structure.
D. D. A Survey of 26 Tribal Courts Supports the Argument Montana is Irrelevant to Tribal
Court’s Jurisdictional Inquiry.
The case studies above analyze how three tribes approach the jurisdictional inquiry, and
the role that Montana plays in each. Those studies reveal that Montana is practically irrelevant to
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those tribes’ jurisdictional inquiry. A survey of 71 decisions since 1988 by 26 tribes, excluding
the tribes analyzed above, suggests this conclusion can be extended beyond the Navajo, HoChunk Nation, and Mashantucket Pequot.334 This survey excludes any decisions by the Navajo
Nation, the Ho-Chunk Nation, or the Mashantucket Pequot. The survey covers almost all cases
available on WestLaw that referred to Montana or its progeny; and includes an additional 36
decisions by tribal courts that discussed civil adjudicatory jurisdiction but did not reference the
Supreme Court’s Montana jurisprudence.335
In the survey, 19 of the 71 cases (27%) were dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but only
three of those cases were dismissed, at least partially, on Montana grounds. And most notably,
only two of those three cases, representing 3% of all the cases surveyed, were dismissed solely
on Montana grounds.336 In the other decision, the Court also found it lacked jurisdiction by
virtue of the tribes’ jurisdictional inquiry. On the other hand, of the 52 decisions that found the
tribal court had jurisdiction, 30 discussed Montana or its progeny and 24 of those decisions
characterized the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent as controlling.337 However, this
characterization is suspect, as again, there was only two cases where a court dismissed a case for
jurisdiction solely because of Montana. Tribal courts likely discuss Montana when they hold
they have jurisdiction over non-consenting non-Indian parties as a safeguard against potential
attack of their jurisdiction in U.S. federal court.
Whether Montana functions in any practical sense should not be determined by the
number of times courts find its exceptions, but by the number of times it limits tribes’
adjudicatory jurisdiction, as the test claims to. Measured against this benchmark, the answer is
that Montana does not.

App’x 1.
App’x 1. One case cited to Water Wheel, a Ninth Circuit decision that was built on Montana. In re. Estate of Ashike,
11 Am. Tribal L. 10 (App. Ct. Hopi Tribe, 2012) (citing to Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area, Inc. v. Larance, 642 F. 3d
802 (9th Cir., 2011). The cases that were dismissed solely on Montana grounds are: Crow v. Parker, 6 Cherokee Rep.
33, (E. Band of Cherokee Indians Cherokee Ct. 2007) and Winstone v. Old Kent Bank-Grand Traverse, No. 98-04127-CV, 2000 WL 35750179 (Grand Traverse Tribal Ct. Feb. 11, 2000).
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III. MONTANA, AN IRRELEVANT AND UNWORKABLE STANDARD
There are costs to unworkable standards.338 One cost is relevance. This article shows that
the paradigm established by Montana and its progeny do not limit tribal courts in any meaningful
way, but are instead mostly irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry in tribal courts. Tribal courts
do not apply the Montana framework because it is disconnected from reality, and its analysis, “as
a matter of reservation governance . . . makes no sense.”339 Volumes of literature criticize the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Montana and its progeny.340 These criticisms all point to one thing,
the Supreme Court’s current framework for determining tribal civil jurisdiction does not work.
Between the three tribes discussed in detail and the survey of twenty-six other tribes, only
two tribes dismissed a case solely on Montana grounds.341 This part hypothesizes the Montana
framework is disregarded because the Supreme Court’s framework is unworkable and the
exhaustion requirement insulates tribal courts from scrutiny. This part concludes by suggesting
the Supreme Court should abandon the Montana framework for a return to first principles in
Native American law as established by Worcester v. Georgia.
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A. A. Lessons from the Analysis
1. Exhaustion Encourages Tribal Innovation
Litigants in tribal court must exhaust their remedies in tribal court before they can
collaterally attack the decision in federal court.342 State and federal courts follow the Supreme
Court’s exhaustion requirement.343 Litigants proceed in tribal court until the courts reach a final
decision on the merits, and must exhaust their options at the tribe’s highest appellate court before
they can appeal to federal court.344 And once in federal court, litigants are limited to attacking the
tribal court’s jurisdiction. This provides tribal courts with space to interpret Montana’s
exceptions broadly or drop the framework altogether. Since courts are jealous for jurisdiction, it
is unsurprising that tribal courts have expanded their jurisdictional reach.345 The exhaustion
requirement and high costs in federal court mean that tribal court decisions will often not be
challenged outside of tribal court.346
In lieu of Montana, tribes have developed their own sophisticated approaches to
determining jurisdiction. These approaches are simultaneously more predictable than Montana
and fairer to non-Indians.347 Requiring an irrelevant and formulistic examination under Montana
does nothing to further tribal judiciaries and serves to complicate, rather than simplify the
jurisdictional inquiry, especially since the Supreme Court has not made Montana waivable. This
uncertainty, known as jurisdictional risk, discourages non-Indians from investing with tribal
enterprises and businesses in Indian country.348 and creates an unnecessary impediment to tribal
sovereignty.
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2. Montana is Not Necessary as a “Safeguard” Against Tribal Courts
One possible takeaway from this article is the way to “fix” Montana’s unworkable
standard is to eliminate or sharply limit tribes’ jurisdiction over non-Indians. That would be a
mistake for several reasons.
First, and perhaps most importantly, tribes do not currently extend jurisdiction over all
possible disputes. This article has shown that Montana is largely irrelevant to tribal decisions on
jurisdiction and has little impact on how they determine jurisdiction. Yet, tribes’ jurisdiction
schemes are not unrestricted long-arm statutes. Rather, tribal court jurisdiction schemes are
sophisticated, and limited for the practical reasons above and by the restrictions in different
tribes’ constitutions.
Second, the Supreme Court’s Montana framework is built on the false notion that tribal
courts are unfair or otherwise deficient. As Chief Judge Martin noted, the “larger concern,
reflected” in Montana and its progeny “is a distrust of the Tribal Courts themselves . . . and, by
extension, a distrust of the very sovereignty of the Indian Nation itself.”349 This distrust of tribes
and their judiciaries is without basis. And this “solution” relies on similarly false conceptions. As
this article has shown through case studies of the Navajo, Ho-Chunk Nation, and Mashantucket
Pequot, tribes have sophisticated legal systems perfectly capable of adjudicating disputes.
Significant literature and sophisticated tribal judiciaries and jurisprudence support this
conclusion.350
Third, tribal courts face practical limits that would prevent them from “overextending"
their jurisdiction to cover individuals with no or only tangential relation to the tribe. Tribal
judiciaries are severely underfunded and work with limited resources.351 This alone prevents
tribes from adjudicating every dispute that tangentially touches on their interests. Rather, tribes
focus their resources on disputes that most affect the tribe and its members, but still hold the

131 (2015). In the Native American law context, Pruett defines “Jurisdictional Risk” as “the combination of
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concluded that “non-tribal businesses ‘limit the amount of business they do on-reservations . . . because the risk
associated with noy knowing the rules before the game begins simply outweighs the potential economic benefit.’”
Id. at 164 (quoting Brief for South Dakota Bankers Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Dollar Gen.
Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496 (U.S. July 18, 2014)).
349
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Crowe, 9 Am. Tribal L. 27, 34 (Eastern Cherokee Ct. 2010).
350
See e.g., supra note 33.
351
U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rts, Broken Promises: Continuing Federal Funding Shortfall for Native Americans, 51–53
(2018).
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courts open to the general public for parties that wish to take advantage of their speedier
resolutions.352 Further, Congress possesses plenary power over tribes’ jurisdiction, so Congress
could at any time restrict the jurisdictional capabilities in the case that tribes “overreach.” 353 This
acts as a practical check and a background constraint, as tribes are wary of provoking backlash
that might lead to Congressional action. Similarly, some have characterized the Montana
framework as an abstention doctrine and suggested that while federal and tribal courts may
possess concurrent jurisdiction, federal courts abstain where “a cause of action arises in Indian
country or involves a ‘reservation affair.’” 354 One commentator suggested that state and federal
courts will interfere where they find it necessary, but will generally defer to the tribal courts’
finding of jurisdiction.355
Fourth, although the United States Supreme Court has also repeatedly expressed
skepticism about making non-Indians subject to “tribal laws,” which they “had no say in creating
. . .[,]” this is the case any time a party is subject to the law of another forum.356 The Supreme
Court has iterated a number of concerns in determining the reach of state long-arm statutes and
whether individuals can fairly be subjected to a state’s jurisdiction or laws. But the Court’s
inquiry focuses on justice, fair play, warning, and consent, not whether a party “had [a] say in
creating the laws that would be applied to them.”357 This focus is hard to explain as anything

352

Compare Taylor Dalton, The Trajectory of Civil Cases in Federal Court, THE JURIS LAB, reprinted in ABOVE THE
LAW (May 28, 2021), https://abovethelaw.com/2021/05/the-trajectory-of-civil-cases-in-federal-court/ (noting the
average length of a case from filing in court to final resolution is 364 days) with Ho-Chunk Nation v. Money Ctrs of
Am., Inc., 9 Am. Tribal L. 308, 308–10 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2010) (taking 194 days from filing to completion).
This claim is further supported by anecdotal evidence, but there is a notable lack of scholarship doing empirical
analysis of tribal cases.
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United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1643 (2021).
354
See, e.g., John J. Harte, Validity of a State Court’s Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country:
Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 65 (1997) (discussing the
Indian Abstention Doctrine in federal courts, which “essentially asserts that, although federal and tribal court
jurisdiction may be concurrent, where a cause of action arises in Indian country or involves a ’reservation affair,’ the
federal court should abstain from exercising its concurrent jurisdiction.” And further arguing “[m]andatory abstention
is justified in that federal courts are permitted a limited appellate review of tribal court decisions after exhaustion.”).
355
Id.
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United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1644 (2021). See also, Hailee McDonald, A Dollar for Your Thoughts,
46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 416 (noting “the primary concern for the Supreme Court appears to be that non-members
do not participate in tribal government. . . . This is an interesting concern [as] this same question does not arise in
instances where an individual from out-of-state is subject to a particular state’s courts and that state’s [laws].”).
357
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985).
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other than a reflection of an assumption that tribal courts are unfair or their forums are somehow
inadequate, with “not typical regulation.”358
Fourth, as discussed in the introduction to this article, the ability to provide a forum for
redress is a crucial part of sovereignty.359 Thus, “fixing” Montana by destroying tribes’
jurisdiction would be an attack against a fundamental component of tribal sovereignty.
3. Beyond Montana: Paths Forward
This article concludes in typical fashion with possible paths forward. These should not be
taken as solutions to Montana, but rather as outgrowths from the research in this article. These
suggestions rely on tribal court jurisprudence and strengthen the argument for further
incorporating tribal voices into discussions of tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.
a. Return to First Principles: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Test Based on
Infringement
More than 150 years ago the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia,
pronounced one of the lasting principles in Native American Law, that Indian nations are
“sovereign nation[s] authorized to govern themselves . . . .”360 Thus, the question to determine
whether a state’s exercise of jurisdiction infringes on a tribe’s sovereignty is “whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”361 There is little reason why this principle should not apply to tribes’ jurisdiction as well.
It is unclear why Montana and its progeny have become so detached from the
fundamental Worcester principles. In Plains Commerce, the Supreme Court cited to Worcester
only to recognize “Indian tribes as ‘distinct, independent, political communities’” and to argue
“tribe’s sovereign interests are now confined to managing tribal land.”362 The Supreme Court’s
abandonment of these principles in the Montana line of cases conflicts with the United States’

Plains Comm. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 338 (2008) (discussing the “novel” nature of
the “Longs’ discrimination claim” arising “directly from Lakota tradition as embedded in Cheyenne River Sioux
tradition and custom. . . .”).
359
See supra, n.1–24 and accompanying text.
360
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361
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
362
Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327, 334 (2008) (citing to Worcester, 31 U.S.
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stated goal of developing tribal judiciaries.363 And, as this article shows, the Montana framework
reflects a Supreme Court detached from tribal legal practice on the ground. The best solution
may lie in a return to Williams, which recognized the rights of Indians to “make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”364
Further, such a return to first principles would create more certainty in Indian Country
and non-Indians dealings with tribes. Non-Indian parties could determine whether they would be
subject to suit by determining whether there is a law that governs their interactions with the
tribes.
Similar to the Ho-Chunk Nation’s jurisdictional inquiry, a Williams jurisdictional scheme
could make jurisdiction depend on whether the tribe has a law that applies to the dispute. Such a
test would simplify the jurisdictional inquiry, be more reflective of the reality in Indian Country,
and respect tribal sovereignty. The state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a dispute “infringes on the
ability of Reservation Indians . . . to be governed by their own laws,” when it displaces the tribal
law that would apply to the dispute.365 Law is relational, a plaintiff’s rights and defendant’s
duties are not freestanding, but depend on their relation to each other.366 So, state jurisdiction
over a dispute involving a non-Indian defendant would infringe on the right of an Indian plaintiff
to be “governed by their own laws.”367 When a tribal law governs conduct and they are subject to
the tribal court’s personal jurisdiction, an individual would be subject to the tribe’s
jurisdiction.368
b. Modify Montana to Permit non-Indian Parties to Consent to Tribal Jurisdiction

363

C.f. Memorandum from the White House on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening Nation-to-Nation Relationships
(Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-tribalconsultation-and-strengthening-nation-to-nation-relationships/.
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Nick Sage, Relational Wrongs and Agency in Tort Theory, 41 OXFORD J.L. STUDS. 1012, 1012 (2021) (“One key
idea in tort theory today . . . is that tort law is relational. A court [considers] the justice of an interaction or other
relationship between two persons. Torts are not wrongs of any sort but relational wrongs: wrongs done by one person
to another”).
367
Id.
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As in any legal system with multiple sovereigns, issues may arise when the law of multiple sovereigns could apply
to a dispute. This is not a new problem. Courts have been settling conflicts of law for hundreds of years. See, e.g.
HERMA HILL KAY, ET. AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3–5 (11th ed. 2022) (discussing early conflicts of laws). Tribal courts
are fully capable of handling such conflicts. And, as discussed above, tribal courts readily apply the law of other
sovereigns when called upon to do so. See, e.g. Ho-Chunk Nation v. Bank of Am., 6 Am. Tribal L. 275, 285, 292 (HoChunk Nation Trial Ct. 2006) (applying New York law).
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The simplest approach—and one that may fit within current precedent—is to permit
parties to consent to tribal jurisdiction, and so waive any objections they may have under
Montana.
Scholars and jurists have both noted how similar the Montana framework is to the United
States Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction inquiry under International Shoe.369 While the
Court has stated that the Montana framework deals with subject-matter jurisdiction, such a view
is inconsistent with how Montana is applied by tribes and the logic behind the Court’s
framework.370 This article has shown that tribal courts generally do not undertake a Montana
inquiry unless prompted to do so by parties in a case. When parties do not make Montana
objections, cases are not dismissed on Montana grounds. These are the characteristics of
waivable personal jurisdiction objections, not subject-matter jurisdiction prerequisites.
Montana also resembles the Supreme Court’s International Shoe personal jurisdiction
doctrine. Whether Montana applies or not is dependent on the identity of the party, i.e. whether
the party is an Indian or not. Additionally, the Supreme “Court’s ‘consensual relationship’
analysis under Montana resembles the Court’s Due Process Clause analysis for purposes of
personal jurisdiction[,]” i.e. the International Shoe framework.371 Under International Shoe and
its progeny, a forum can only exercise jurisdiction over a non-consenting party if the nonconsenting party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so that “‘the maintenance
of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’372 One way a party can establish
minimum contacts is through entering a consensual relationship with forum residents.373 It would
hold truer to the Court’s precedent and how tribes treat Montana if it was considered a matter of
personal jurisdiction rather than subject-matter jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. REV. 1499
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B. Studying Tribal Law is Important
Little scholarship analyzes tribal law.374 However, many cases are only litigated in tribal
court.375 The consequence is large gaps in scholarship. Existing literature analyzing Montana
generally presupposes that the Montana paradigm is used, and limits tribal courts’ jurisdiction.376
This article suggests the paradigm is not used and does not functionally limit tribal court
jurisdiction.
Civil jurisdiction is not the only issue where tribal court practice may differ from what
scholars write. The solution for this is for scholars to engage with tribal law and tribal court
decisions. This article has analyzed different tribal court approaches to civil jurisdiction, similar
to how notes analyze circuit splits. Such analysis is not new. Calls for scholars to seriously
engage with tribal law and tribal court decisions are longstanding. And other contested issues in
Native American law would benefit from analysis of tribal court splits to determine how the law
is applied. This article then has little to add in these regards. All this article can do is add to those
calls and provide a template for analyzing tribal court splits.
C. Tribes Should Make Tribal Law More Transparent
This paper also calls for tribes to invest in publishing their court decisions and making
their legal system more transparent.
Many tribes have undertaken significant efforts to make their cases widely accessible.
VAWA 2022 will contribute to this by requiring tribes to publish their criminal law and rules.377
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But see Tribal Law Journal, UNIV. N.M. SCH. LAW, https://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/index.html (last visited Feb. 20,
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Tribes should not stop with VAWA’s requirements. This article argues that analysis of tribal law
and case law is essential to promoting tribal sovereignty. Such analysis, however, depends on
tribes providing access to their case law. Access to tribal law is also essential to “demystifying”
tribal law, which will help normalize tribal jurisdiction and allay concerns about tribal courts
inadequacy.
Conclusion
This article sought to highlight the developed judiciaries of Indian nations, and
respectfully analyze their jurisprudence. While this article was confined to the topic of civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction, tribes’ judiciaries are just as developed in many other fields, and
similarly worthy of study. Tribal judiciaries’ approaches have been explored in other contexts,
but such study has mostly been confined to environmental law.378 This article illustrates that
tribes are equally capable in other fields of law and thus can similarly serve as “laboratories of
legal innovation.”379 Tribes have their own sophisticated methods for determining jurisdiction.
Just as other courts, they are jealous for jurisdiction, but they determine jurisdiction fairly and
predictably through sophisticated analyses. This article explored the civil jurisdiction
jurisprudence of three tribes and the role that Montana plays in their jurisprudence. However, the
Navajo Nation, Ho-Chunk Nation, and Mashantucket (Western) Pequot Tribal Nation are not the
only tribes worthy of study. Each tribe has its own method of determining jurisdiction; and the
hundreds of tribal courts that remain unexamined have more insights to offer.
This article’s survey of decisions by tribal courts suggests that Montana and its general
presumption against jurisdiction are practically irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry in tribal
courts. Scholars have called for the United States Supreme Court to change its approach to
jurisdiction for decades.380 This article adds little on that front. However, it suggests that tribes
have not waited for the Supreme Court to abandon its unworkable test. Instead, tribal courts have
developed their own workable tests, and stabilized the “jurisdictional crazy quilt” left by the
Supreme Court’s precedent.381
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In 2010, Professor Fletcher called for a “paradigm shifting reexamination by Indian tribes
and Indian people about their place in the American constitutional structure.”382 This article
suggests tribal courts have done just that, and begun the paradigm shift, establishing their own
space in the jurisdictional complex independent of the antiquated requirements and assumptions
underlying Montana.
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Matthew Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COL. L. REV. 973, 976 (2010) (emphasis
omitted).
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200 No
0

Yes

No

Yes

Yes,
nothing
occurred
on tribal
trust
land

Winstone
v. Old
Kent
BankGrand
Traverse,
No. 98-04127-CV,
2000 WL
35750179
(Grand
Traverse
Tribal Ct.
Feb. 11,
2000)

In re Estate
of Ashike

Hopi

201 Yes
2

No

No

68

In re
Estate of
Ashike, 11
Am. Tribal
L. 10
(Hopi
Tribe App.
Ct. 2012)

LaRance v.
Hopi Tribe

Hopi

201 Yes
0

No

No

LaRance
v. Hopi
Tribe, 10
Am. Tribal
L. 345
(Hopi
Tribe App.
Ct. 2010)

Simpson v.
Barber

InterTribal
Court of
Appeals

200 Yes
4

Yes

Yes

Simpson v.
Barber,
No.
ITCN/AC.
Cv. 04003, 2004
WL
5748396
(InterTribal Ct.
App. of
Nev., Nov.
15, 2004)

Cole v.
Kaw
Housing
Authority

Kaw
Nation

199 Yes
5

No

No

Cole v.
Kaw Hous.
Auth., 4
Okla. Trib.
362 (Kaw
Nation
Dist. Ct.
1995)
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Cole v.
Kaw
Housing
Authority

Kaw
Nation

199 Yes
5

No

No

Cole v.
Kaw Hous.
Auth., 4
Okla. Trib.
281 (Kaw
Nation
Dist. Ct.
1995)

Sherman v.
Enbridge
Energy
LLC

Leech
Lake
Band of
Ojibwe

200 Yes
9

Yes

Yes

Sherman
v.
Enbridge
Energy
LLC, 10
Am. Tribal
L. 66
(Leech
Lake Band
of Ojibwe
Tribal Ct.
Trial Div.,
2009)
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Jackson v.
Leech Lake
Band of
Ojibwe
Council
Members

Leech
Lake
Band of
Ojibwe

200 Yes
6

No

Yes

Jackson v.
Leech
Lake Band
of Ojibwe
Council
Members,
No. CV04-113,
2004 WL
6012166
(Leech
Lake Band
of Ojibwe
Tribal Ct.
Trial Div.,
Dec. 12,
2006)

Heritage
Interiors v.
G.P.
Graham
Constructio
n Corp.

Little
Traverse
Bands of
Odawa

200 No
3

Yes

Yes

Heritage
Interiors v.
G.P.
Graham
Const.
Corp., No.
C-0430803, 2003
WL
25867320
(Tribal Ct.
of the
Little
Traverse
Bands of
Odawa
Indians,
Oct. 2,
2003)
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Fountain v.
Mohegan
Tribal
Gaming
Authority

Mohegan

201 Yes
1

No

No

Fountain
v.
Mohegan
Tribal
Gaming
Auth., 10
Am. Tribal
L. 263
(Mohegan
Gaming
Disp. Trial
Ct. 2011)

D'Ambra v.
Maikshilo

Mohegan

201 Yes
2

No

No

D'Ambra
v.
Maikshilo,
12 Am.
Tribal L.
210
(Mohegan
Gaming
Disp. Trial
Ct. 2012)

Mohegan
Tribe of
Indians of
Connecticut
v. Trading
Cove
Associates

Mohegan

199 Yes
9

No

No

Mohegan
Tribe of
Indians of
Conn. v.
Trading
Cove
Assocs., 2
Am. Tribal
L. 383
(Mohegan
Gaming
Disp. Trial
Ct. 1999)
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Lubrano v.
Brennan
Beer
Gorman
Architects
LLP

Mohegan

200 No
8

No

Yes

Enlow v.
Bevenue

Muscogee
(Creek)

199 Yes
4

No

Yes

Enlow v.
Bevenue, 4
Okla. Trib.
175
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Sup. Ct.
1994)

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
The
American
Tobacco
Company

Muscogee
(Creek)

199 Yes
8

Yes

Yes

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Am.
Tobacco
Co., 5
Okla. Trib.
401
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
1998)

73

Yes

No,
explicitl
y held
within
Montana
jurisdicti
on

Lubrano v.
Brennan
Beer
Gorman
Architects
LLP, 7
Am. Tribal
L. 369
(Mohegan
Gaming
Disp. Ct.
App.,
2008)

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Creek
Nation
Housing
Authority

Muscogee
(Creek)

200 Yes
4

No

No

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Creek
Nation
Hous.
Auth., 8
Okla. Trib.
355
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
2004)

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Indian
Country
U.S.A., Inc.

Muscogee
(Creek)

198 Yes
9

Yes

Yes

Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Indian
Country
U.S.A.,
Inc., 1
Okla. Trib.
267
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
1989)

74

National
Muscogee
Council of
(Creek)
the
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Preferred
Managemen
t
Corporation

198 Yes
9

No

Yes

Nat'l
Council of
the
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation v.
Preferred
Mgmt.
Corp., 1
Okla. Trib.
278
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
1989)

One
Thousand
Four
Hundred
Sixty Three
and 14/100
Dollars v.
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation

200 Yes
5

No

Yes

One
Thousand
Four
Hundred
Sixty
Three and
14/100
Dollars v.
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation, 9
Okla. Trib.
83
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Sup. Ct.
2005)

Muscogee
(Creek)

75

Preferred
Muscogee
Managemen (Creek)
t
Corporation
v. National
Council of
the
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation

199 Yes
0

Yes

Yes

Preferred
Mgmt.
Corp. v.
Nat’l
Council of
the
Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation, 2
Okla. Trib.
37
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Sup. Ct.
1990)

Thlopthlocc
o Tribal
Town v.
McGertt

Muscogee
(Creek)

200 Yes
5

No

No

Thlopthloc
co Tribal
Town v.
McGertt, 9
Okla. Trib.
72
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
2005)

Walker v.
Tiger

Muscogee
(Creek)

200 Yes
4

Yes

Yes

Walker v.
Tiger, 10
Okla. Trib.
650
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Sup. Ct.
2004)
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Seminole
Muscogee
Nation
(Creek)
Developme
nt Authority
v. Morris

200 No
0

No

Yes

No

No

Seminole
Nation
Dev. Auth.
v. Morris,
7 Okla.
Trib. 67
(Muscogee
(Creek)
Nation
Dist. Ct.
2000)

Ponca
Tribal
Election
Board v.
Snake

198 No
8

No

Yes

No

No

Election
Bd. v.
Snake, 1
Okla. Trib.
209 (Ponca
Tribe Ct.
of Indian
App.,
1988)

200 No
0

No

Yes

No

No

Seminole
Nation
Dev. Auth.
v. Morris,
7 Okla.
Trib. 30
(Ct. of
Indian
Offenses
for the
Seminole
Tribe,
2000)

Ponca
Tribe

Seminole
Seminole
Nation
Nation
Developme
nt Authority
v. Morris

77

Kelly v.
Kelly

Standing
Rock
Sioux
Tribal
Court

200 Yes
8

Yes

Yes

Kelly v.
Kelly, No.
DV 08013, 2008
WL
7904116
(Standing
Rock
Sioux
Tribal Ct.
June 23,
2008)

Guggolz v.
Farmer's
Union Oil
Company

Standing
Rock
Sioux
Tribal
Court

200 Yes
7

Yes

Yes

Guggolz v.
Farmer's
Union Oil
Co., No.
COMP
0681, 2007
WL
7274883
(Standing
Rock
Sioux
Tribal Ct.
Feb. 8,
2007)

78

Goblin v.
Tulalip
Tribes'
Board of
Directors

Tulalip

200 No
2

No

United
States v.
Medure

White
Earth
Band

200 Yes
9

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

79

No

Goblin v.
Tulalip
Tribes' Bd.
of Dirs.,
Nos. TULCi-6/00200, TULCi-6/00219, 2002
WL
34506023
(Tulalip
Tribal Ct.
App., Dec.
6, 2002)
United
States v.
Medure, 8
Am. Tribal
L. 304
(White
Earth Band
of
Chippewa
Tribal Ct.
Civ. Div.,
2009)

Wright v.
Cannedy

Wichita
Tribe

199 No
2

No

Yes

80

No

Wright v.
Cannedy,
2 Okla.
Trib. 363
(Ct. of
Indian
App. for
the
Wichita
Tribe,
1992)

